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“ALONGSIDE THE BEST”?
The Future of the Canadian Forces
Andrew C. Richter
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Canadian Forces face a rangeof challenges. Reduced defense spending, uncertainty regarding missions
and tasks, and the lingering effects of recent scandal have resulted in a signifi-
cantly diminished military. In the midst of a rapidly emerging “revolution in
military affairs” (RMA), the Canadian Forces (CF) are poorly positioned to in-
troduce next-generation weapon systems.1 At the same time, Canada’s allies, in
particular the United States, have undertaken dramatic defense modernization
programs. It is this divergence—Canada’s reduced military capability at a time
of swiftly advancing technology—that will be the focus of this article. Spe-
cifically, the article will examine the degree to which the Canadian Forces are
currently interoperable with its allies, and the steps that need to be taken if they
are to remain a viable fighting force in the future. It will suggest that rather than
maintaining the current (largely fictitious) goal of “multi-purpose, combat
capable” forces—as called for in Canada’s 1994 defense white paper—the CF
needs to prioritize among the services to ensure that
at least one maintains a wide range of interoperability
capabilities.2
The service that can make the best case for first
priority is the navy, as a result of its modern fleet,
widespread political support, and broad range of mis-
sions tihat it can undertake.3 While this will not be an
easy decision for the Department of National Defence
(DND), a failure to make it will have enormous
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consequences, as a “rusted out” military will be incapable of carrying out Cana-
dian defense and foreign policy goals. In addition, given the importance that
Canada places on participating in multilateral operations, it is critical that Can-
ada maintain at least some meaningful capacity to do so.4
As a preliminary, “prioritization” should be defined. In the context of this ar-
ticle, it refers to a process whereby one service receives the majority of the depart-
ment budget and, in particular, the preponderance of the capital equipment
budget. The prioritized service is able to field more modern equipment over a
shorter time frame than would otherwise be the case. Prioritization does not
mean that the other two services would disappear or that they would not receive
funding for their own reequipment programs. On the contrary, they would re-
main vital in the contemporary strategic environment, and both would retain
valuable capabilities. However, given Canada’s limited security spending (to be
examined below) and the enormous cost of modern defense equipment, it will
simply not be possible to modernize all three services adequately. Prioritization
will produce one service capable of undertaking a broad range of missions and
tasks; the other two will focus, if they are to remain viable, on one or two pri-
mary missions—missions that do not require disproportionate funding.
Over the last decade, military technology has been transformed, a development
with which all countries have had to deal. At one end of the spectrum is the
United States, which because of its economic power, global responsibilities, and
enormous defense establishment has eagerly embraced military change.5 In-
deed, the U.S. military has long emphasized advanced technology in pursuit of
its strategic and military objectives, and thus the current RMA is entirely consis-
tent with traditional American thinking.6 While recognizing that pursuing the
RMA will be an expensive undertaking, the United States has demonstrated that
it is committed to maintaining the world’s most advanced defense force. The
2002 U.S. defense budget is $340 billion, roughly equivalent to the combined to-
tal spent by all other countries.7
The response of U.S. allies, however, to these changes has been less certain. To
begin with, there has been considerable frustration that the long-hoped-for
(and much anticipated) “peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War proved so
fleeting. While defense spending in Europe and Canada had never reached the
level that it did in the United States during the four-decade dispute with the So-
viet Union, the allies had nonetheless relentlessly emphasized military prepara-
tions and forces, and they consequently expected that once the conflict ended,
substantial military reductions could finally be achieved. Even the realization
that the post–Cold War environment would remain unstable and prone to peri-
odic violence did not appreciably alter this belief. Thus by the mid-1990s, when
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advanced technology promised to transform military forces (and threatened to
render existing forces obsolete), there was a palpable sense of frustration that
large-scale defense expenditures would now be required.
Yet as even a cursory glance at European and Canadian defense preparedness
and spending reveals, this military investment has not taken place in those na-
tions. The modest allied reaction to the RMA can be linked to two critical fac-
tors—the general weakness of many Western countries in the technologies that
are fuelling the RMA, and an unwillingness to spend the money required to field
advanced defense forces. With regard to the first point, it is widely acknowledged
that U.S. companies are at the forefront of the information revolution; as such, it
is they that most often develop advanced technologies that have military appli-
cations.8 In general, U.S. technology and defense companies are stronger and
more competitive than their European and Canadian counterparts. American
companies are usually the first to innovate and to bring important new technol-
ogies to market, which in turn feeds the major defense contractors a continuing
stream of new designs and systems.9
As for the second point, none of the major European allies or Canada seems
prepared to spend the resources necessary to field state-of-the-art defense
forces. While the United States consistently devotes between 3 and 4 percent of
its gross national product to defense, most European allies spend between 2 and
3 percent, while for Canada the figure is an embarrassing 1.2 percent.10 Further,
in contrast to the United States, the allies have not demonstrated a willingness to
increase defense spending substantially post–11 September 2001, a failure that
will result in an even larger spending divergence in the future (indeed, prior to
the terrorist attacks, concern was mounting over the continued defense spend-
ing cuts in several European countries).11 Lastly, the issue is not just how much—
or, more accurately, how little—Europeans spend on defense but what they
spend their money on. Thus, while the European allies collectively spend
approximately 60 percent of what the United States does (i.e., about $180 bil-
lion), they do not have 60 percent of U.S. capabilities.12 As Ethan Kapstein has re-
cently noted, “Europe seems to get ‘less bang for the buck’ than the United
States.”13
The result is a growing “capabilities gap” between the United States and its al-
lies, one that shows no sign of diminishing. This gap was first noted at the time
of the Gulf War, but it was the 1999 Kosovo conflict that clearly revealed a signif-
icant difference in the capabilities of U.S. and European defense forces (not to
mention the virtual chasm that existed between U.S. and Canadian forces).14 In
spite of widespread European and Canadian recognition and discussion of the
problem since that time, the gap has not closed; defense cuts continue to down-
grade military forces.15
R I C H T E R 6 9
3
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
On both sides of the Atlantic there is considerable concern over this gap and
growing unease over its implications. Such concern led the American Defense
Science Board, a senior advisory panel, to undertake a study in 1999 that exam-
ined how U.S. allies were coping with rapid technological change and whether
there were any steps that the United States could take to ease the transition.16
Contrary to the popular view that a rampaging unilateralism has overtaken
Washington, there is a widespread American acceptance of the importance of
working with coalition partners in international security issues. The United
States has realized—perhaps somewhat reluctantly—that it is compelled for
diplomatic as well as practical reasons to ally itself with other actors.17 This cir-
cumstance has applied not only to operations under the authority of the United
Nations or Nato but also in the context of ad hoc coalitions, like the present cam-
paign in Afghanistan.18 However, in spite of this recognition, allied military
weakness may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of such operations. Indeed, there is
growing concern in the United States that such weakness may ultimately in-
crease the risks to American troops, a prospect that could make future strategic
cooperation difficult.
Similarly, Nato officials, after a lengthy period of apparent indifference, now
seem to appreciate the dimensions of the problem. In the most recent reflection
of this newfound awareness, Nato’s secretary general, Lord George Robertson,
warned in February 2002 that if the capabilities gap “[is] allowed to increase, it
will mean there won’t be coalitions in the future because the Americans will not
be able to operate [with the allies].”19 In essence, Robertson’s warning was a re-
statement of one he had made during the Kosovo war, when he had spoken of a
“two speed” alliance, in which Europe would be unable to participate in mis-
sions that the United States led.20
It is difficult to overstate the significance of these warnings or, even more im-
portantly, their sources. There is now recognition within Nato that the inability
of allies to work together on the battlefield will undermine—and perhaps ulti-
mately doom—the alliance. The United States might restrict its role in alliance
missions to providing the advanced logistics, lift, and airpower that it alone
can supply. Tension could arise if European and Canadian armies, accordingly,
find themselves disproportionately responsible for the dangerous manpower-
intensive tasks that can lead to significant casualties.21 Further, the United States
might feel that it is entitled to have a say in alliance decision making commensu-
rate with the fact that it provides the bulk of military assets.22
It is against this backdrop that the debate over Canada’s defense preparedness
and interoperability with the United States is taking place. To many observers,
Canadian defense weakness means that Canada will become a U.S. ally in
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political terms only, unable to make meaningful military contributions to mul-
tilateral coalitions; some critics would suggest that this day has already arrived.
However, Canada’s difficulties in cooperating with the U.S. military and in deal-
ing with advanced defense technology are similar to those of many other Ameri-
can allies and, given the extensive history of defense cooperation between the
two countries, constitute a troubling development. Indeed, since 11 September
2001, the issues related to interoperability have taken on a new urgency in the
North American context, as the various Canadian agencies dealing with border
issues, law enforcement, and intelligence have begun to integrate themselves for-
mally around joint tasks with their American counterparts.23 Perhaps most im-
portantly, a new regional military structure, U.S. Northern Command,
responsible for American homeland defense, became operational on 1 October
2002. NorthCom’s area of operations will include not only the United States and
Canada but Mexico and parts of the Caribbean as well. It is apparent that this
new command will create additional pressure upon the two countries’ militaries
to cooperate.24
Viewed from a broader perspective, then, the Canadian experience with ad-
vanced military technology and interoperability is an interesting case study in
how U.S. allies are adapting to the emerging military and strategic environment.
In this regard, while virtually all Western militaries now acknowledge that some
form of RMA is taking place (and most are trying to identify strategies for deal-
ing with it), their forces are evolving in very gradual, measured ways. Thus, ex-
amining how one key U.S. ally is adapting will tell us much about the challenges
that other actors may face. Most crucially, it will offer lessons useful to Washing-
ton in how to approach allies who wish to participate in multilateral operations,
and it will offer guidelines as to the types of capabilities that allies can be ex-
pected to provide.
The first section of this article examines interoperability itself—what it is and
why it is important. It also briefly looks at recent developments that have made
interoperability such a major concern for the militaries of many countries. The
next part will focus on Canadian defense capabilities in each of the three services
and upon the modernization programs that are presently under way, by way of
determining which service is best positioned to take advantage of the RMA and
what steps need to be taken. The last section offers concluding observations and
findings, as well as suggestions on strategic development in light of the events of
11 September 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led war on terrorism.
INTEROPERABILITY IN THE CANADA-U.S. CONTEXT
While the concept of interoperability may appear to be relatively straightfor-
ward, in practice interoperability is almost always controversial and difficult to
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realize.25 It is therefore important to have a clear definition of what inter-
operability is and of why its achievement can be so problematic.
According to a recent RAND Corporation study, interoperability “is a mea-
sure of the degree to which various organizations or individuals are able to operate
together to achieve a common goal.”26 Thus interoperability is not necessarily
a military concept but has applications across the business, political, and strate-
gic worlds. For the purposes of this article, though, interoperability will be ex-
amined in its military sense, and hence a more precise definition is required. The
U.S. military defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and
to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”27
This notion of seamless cooperation and efficiency is the hallmark of an
interoperable fighting force. This definition includes issues related to standard-
ization, integration, cooperation, strategy, and defense production.28
Military interoperability can be further defined at the operational and tech-
nical levels.29 Operational interoperability addresses support to military opera-
tions, focusing on people and procedures. Implementation of operational
interoperability involves testing, certification, training, and force configuration.
This definition encompasses the entire spectrum of military operations.30 Tech-
nical interoperability is essential to achieving operational interoperability.
Rather than focusing on people, however, technical interoperability stresses
communications and electronics equipment, ensuring that information can be
relayed quickly and efficiently.31 On the modern battlefield, rapid communica-
tions are a necessity for effective operations—information related to weapon
systems, software and associated operating systems, and intelligence at the com-
mand level. In a worst-case scenario—two militaries with identical weapons as
well as common training and procedures but incompatible communications
and data networks—cooperation will be difficult and the result could be errors,
mistakes, and missed opportunities.
In a general sense, the ultimate goal of interoperability is not to ensure that all
contributors to a coalition will necessarily deploy similar military forces or
weapon systems but rather to achieve a practicable level of cooperation between
their contingents.32 As Danford Middlemiss and Dennis Stairs have recently ar-
gued in a study on interoperability in the Canadian context, “from the military
point of view, the overarching objective is thus to make a militarily relevant and
effective contribution to multinational security efforts at the maximum possible
level of efficiency.”33
But definitions and descriptions alone cannot convey the critical role that
interoperability plays in the contemporary military environment. Recent opera-
tions in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as evidence from experiments and
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exercises, point to the dramatic improvement in operational effectiveness that
can be achieved by using advanced command, control, communications, com-
puters, and intelligence systems and sharing information in a timely manner. A
“common operating picture,” along with the associated decision-support capabil-
ities, can have enormous effects on the pace and nature of military engagements.34
This is not to suggest that achieving interoperable defense forces is a simple
task. On the contrary, the challenges posed by differing force structures, weapon
systems, and training techniques highlight the problems of realizing inter-
operability in practice. A recent U.S. study that examined forty coalition opera-
tions identified a long list of difficulties, including divergences between U.S. and
allied forces, differences in decision-making procedures, and communications
discrepancies.35
In addition to such apparent obstacles, a wide range of “soft factors” can
make effective cooperation virtually impossible. Such factors can include dis-
agreement over or misunderstanding of goals, priorities, and rules of engage-
ment; commitment of national forces to incompatible tactical, organizational,
or other professional doctrines; and outright policy disputes.36 Such sources of
divergence can create havoc in the field, particularly when the individual contin-
gents involved are not large enough to be self-sufficient.
However, no discussion of the challenges to interoperability should mask the
real benefits that it offers, particularly to smaller countries. Most significantly,
interoperability enables a country with only modest military capabilities to con-
tribute in a meaningful way to multinational operations.37 Such contributions
tangibly demonstrate a commitment to resolving the conflict at hand. Perhaps
most critically, interoperable military forces offer visibility to other countries,
and they can generate political “IOUs” from coalition partners and allies alike,
chips that can be cashed in at some future point.
At the same time, though, interoperability has political costs, arising espe-
cially from the perception of reduced sovereignty and a general impression of
weakness resulting from acknowledgment that one’s military is no longer able to
act independently. Thus, for example, multilateral missions may involve a signif-
icant loss of decision-making power for the smaller coalition powers and create
an impression that a country has little say in how its forces are used.38 Further-
more, a history of successful military interoperability may create pressure to
participate in future missions, even those that do not have strong domestic po-
litical support, as defense ties are created and military alliances forged.
As far as Canada and the CF are concerned, interoperability has long been a
major goal. Since 1945, Canadian governments have accepted that the country’s
military forces are incapable of defending the country on their own and that as a
result cooperation with the United States and other allies is necessary. Canada
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was therefore a major supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and signed
an air defense agreement with the United States in 1958. Both treaties required
Canada to train and field military forces that could cooperate effectively with al-
lies, although throughout the Cold War (but particularly after 1970) there were
persistent warnings that Canada’s defense forces were inadequate and lacked the
equipment and personnel necessary for sustained military operations.39
The 1994 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the need for Canada to maintain
diverse and capable military forces. The white paper rejected the argument that
Canada required only a defense force largely focused around “constabulary”
tasks;40 instead it held that Canada “needs armed forces that are able to operate
with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations
against a capable opponent—that is, able to fight ‘alongside the best, against the
best.’”41 The white paper left no doubt that Canada needed a modern defense es-
tablishment, one that could cooperate with a U.S. military that was the world
leader in introducing and deploying sophisticated military technology.42
Since that time, in spite of significant defense spending cuts, the goal of an
interoperable CF has been reiterated on several occasions.43 In 1999, DND re-
leased a major planning document intended to mould defense strategy for the
first two decades of the new century. Titled Shaping the Future of Canadian De-
fence: A Strategy for 2020, the study established both short and long-range goals
for the Canadian military. Among those goals was to “strengthen [Canada’s]
military relationship with the U.S. military to ensure Canadian and U.S. forces
are interoperable and capable of combined operations in key selected areas.”44 In
addition, it identified three targets for the next five years: to manage inter-
operability with allies so as to permit “seamless operational integration at short
notice”; to develop a program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible
with Canada’s “principal allies”; and to expand the joint and combined exercise
program to include “all environments and exchanges with the U.S.”45 While
interoperability was explicitly discussed in only one of the eight core objectives
identified for the CF, “it is hard to resist the conclusion,” as one observer recently
noted, “that [interoperability with the United States] is the [objective] that mat-
ters most.”46
The goal of interoperability was reaffirmed in Strategic Capability Planning,
released in June 2000 by the vice chief of the Defence Staff. It noted that by
“achieving the goal of interoperability with U.S. forces in particular, who are
currently and for the foreseeable future setting the standard for advanced mili-
tary equipment, [the Canadian Forces] will almost certainly be capable of oper-
ating effectively with the rest of [Canada’s] major allies, providing significant
flexibility in [Canada’s] approach to foreign affairs.”47
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Lastly, in At a Crossroads in 2002, the chief of the Defense Staff again gave pri-
ority to interoperability. This report noted that “maintaining interoperability
remains key to the future relevance of the CF” and highlighted common training
practices, the establishment of joint doctrine, and participation in the Multina-
tional Interoperability Council (which aims to enhance interoperability
through “improved data exchange and operational information”).48
In sum, interoperability is a primary goal of the Canadian Forces.49 However,
at a time when the pace of military innovation is dramatically increasing,
achieving interoperability in practice poses serious challenges.
FORCE STRUCTURE AND SERVICE MODERNIZATION PLANS
The Canadian Forces today suffer the consequences of decades of neglect, inade-
quate funding, and questionable decisions regarding force structure. As a result,
they are in a relatively poor position—at least in comparison to many other West-
ern nations—to field interoperable defense forces and to take advantage of the
RMA. At best, they can pursue what some observers have called a “niche” RMA
strategy, while fielding specialized forces that offer interoperability capabilities.50
The Department of National Defence was slow to recognize the military
changes brought about by the revolution in technology.51 Inertia seemed to be
the primary DND response until around 1998, when a belated effort to study the
revolution in military affairs began.52 This response was slow not only in com-
parison to most of Canada’s allies but came more than a decade after the Penta-
gon first began to recognize and study the RMA.
The combination of the slow departmental response with limited defense
budgets has, in turn, meant that all three services have been sluggish in devel-
oping RMA plans. However, one area that has witnessed significant change in
the CF is command and control. Over the past few years, numerous new bod-
ies have been established, including a Joint Imagery Centre, an Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Fusion Centre, and a Joint Operations
Group.53 As can be seen from these examples, the notion of “jointness,” which
many believe to be a key component of the RMA, has been eagerly adopted by
DND. An additional step has been the amalgamation of the 1st Canadian Di-
vision Headquarters with the Joint Force Headquarters, to create the Canadian
Joint Force Headquarters.54 While limited in terms of capabilities, each of these
new structures demonstrates some recognition that a transformation in com-
mand and control is required in the RMA environment.
DND has also signified its intention to create a new, highly mobile ground
force. In 2000, the minister of national defense announced the CF’s plan to es-
tablish “a combat-ready strike force to respond swiftly to global crises to prevent
the loss of innocent life and strengthen Canada’s influence with its allies.”55 This
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force similarly seems to be an attempt at creating a more RMA-relevant force, as
rapid response has been shown to be crucial in the post–Cold War strategic
environment.
In spite of these changes and plans, however, the services themselves have
very limited abilities to restructure themselves to take advantage of changes in
military technology. Each of the services—but in particular the air force and the
army—has dated or even antiquated equipment and is unlikely to acquire ad-
vanced weapons platforms in the near future. The implications of this develop-
ment have so far gone largely unrecognized in DND;56 this, however, cannot
continue much longer, at least not if the department intends to formulate a co-
herent defense strategy. To put it simply, a moment of truth is coming for the Ca-
nadian military, which would be wise to consider the options and make its
choices well before decisions are effectively made for it.
The Army
Of the three services of the CF, the army is in the worst shape militarily, presently
the least able to carry out its stated missions, let alone accept new ones. It also
suffers from dated equipment and political indifference. The result is a force un-
certain of its present and future, and an unlikely candidate to receive priority.
The army today numbers about twenty-three thousand personnel, or about
40 percent of the total CF.57 This numerical strength should not come as a sur-
prise, given the wide range of tasks the army (theoretically, if not in practice)
performs, ranging from conventional warfare at one end of the conflict spec-
trum, to peacekeeping and other low-intensity conflict (LIC) missions, and
more recently, to domestic tasks like fighting floods.58
However, it is peacekeeping that has become most important for the army
over the last several decades. Successive Canadian governments have empha-
sized peacekeeping, and there is a widespread international perception that the
army has been geared specifically toward the task.59 In addition, the declaratory
Canadian emphasis—at least during the five-year tenure (1996–2000) of For-
eign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy—on “soft power” and “human security”
has given peacekeeping and other LIC tasks priority over more traditional army
missions.60 The result is an army with a combat capability that has been system-
atically reduced for decades.
The prominence of peacekeeping (and related peace-support operations) can
be seen most dramatically by examining the number of such missions that the
Canadian Forces have accepted in the recent past. Canada participated in nine-
teen United Nations and non-UN peacekeeping assignments between 1947 and
1986; that number ballooned to over twenty-five between 1988 and 2000.61 The
acceptance of so many missions has created considerable strain for the army,
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which has frequently found it difficult to provide the forces pledged by the
government.62
Peacekeeping, however, is essentially irrelevant to the RMA, a fact having ma-
jor implications if the army is to remain interoperable with the land forces of
Canada’s allies. This is not to suggest that RMA weapons can play no role in
peacekeeping or other LIC missions; nonetheless, the technological require-
ments of advanced military platforms, combined with the emphasis on sensing
equipment, simply do not translate well at the low end of the spectrum and may
even be counterproductive in some cases.63
Peacekeeping aside, the army is largely incapable of carrying out its present
commitments and would require a complete overhaul to become more RMA
relevant. The army’s standing field forces consist of three mechanized brigade
groups. Each group is composed of three infantry battalions, an armored regi-
ment, an artillery regiment, and an engineer regiment, along with combat sup-
port and combat service support.64 While each brigade should number about six
thousand personnel, their current strength is actually about 4,500 (a figure that
is reached only with the inclusion of hundreds of reservists). Further, while each
should be capable of operating without assistance, the reality is that were a Ca-
nadian brigade group deployed, it would be heavily dependent on additional re-
sources provided by allies, especially for fire support, engineers, and electronic
warfare.
The term “mechanized brigade group” is a peculiarly Canadian one and thus
deserves additional comment. A brigade is a basic army formation; a brigade
group is more comprehensive. A mechanized brigade group is based predomi-
nantly on infantry but is equipped with a variety of fighting vehicles. These vehi-
cles normally include tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as
long-range howitzers and other artillery. This combination of firepower and
mobility allows the group, ideally, to undertake a broad range of operations.65
For overseas engagements, the army is supposed to be able to field a single
“Sabre” brigade group, which consists of mechanized infantry battalions, an ar-
mor regiment, armored reconnaissance, an engineer regiment, and a service
battalion. Such a brigade has a complement of six thousand personnel and
would be augmented by air defense and tactical aviation. Units drawn from the
three field brigades would form the Sabre brigade, which, it is envisaged, would
operate as part of a larger multinational or binational force and would necessar-
ily be able to integrate its combat functions with those of the larger formation.66
However, the Sabre brigade is not designed to take part in high-intensity com-
bat, only low-to-middle-level engagements. Thus, if it were ever deployed—
which it has never been—particular care would have to be taken to ensure that it
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was not placed in a sophisticated warfare environment, a restriction that obvi-
ously reduces its utility.67
As to what would constitute an appropriate conflict for the brigade, there are
grounds for concern. According to the army, “low-level operations” involve ter-
rorism or some form of insurgency (with the application of the minimum nec-
essary force), while a “midlevel operation” is another term for limited war, like
the Gulf War or the 1999 Kosovo campaign, where the use of force is localized
and noncontinuous. Lastly, “high-intensity conflict” refers to total war. How-
ever, in the twenty-first century, it is not at all clear that such terms have much
meaning or that they delineate operationally distinct missions. Put simply, as 11
September has demonstrated, terrorism can inflict enormous devastation (in-
deed, should terrorist groups get hold of weapons of mass destruction, the re-
sults could be indistinguishable from those of total war), and the fight against
terrorism requires an array of capabilities and strategies. Further, the prolifera-
tion of sophisticated conventional weapons in the 1980s and ’90s means that
even substate actors and terrorist groups may now possess significant military
capabilities; consequently, considerable caution must be employed when engag-
ing them. Thus the operational distinctions that Canada seems to assume may
no longer exist. The net result is that the constraints limiting the Sabre brigade
must be interpreted so broadly as to all but preclude its participation in opera-
tions against any country or actor with modern defensive capabilities.
The question of whether the Canadian Forces are even capable of deploying
the Sabre brigade is an open one. While officially DND maintains that it can ful-
fil all its commitments, the army has acknowledged that deploying the brigade
would require its “entire focus” and could require the withdrawal of Canadian
peacekeepers overseas.68 In addition, should the unit suffer significant casual-
ties, finding replacements would pose an enormous challenge, one that would
quickly overwhelm the manpower reserves (such as they are) of the army. Fur-
ther, the army lacks strategic lift; the CC-130 Hercules transports (to be exam-
ined below) would be hard pressed to carry much of the brigade’s equipment.69
Lastly, regular training in the Canadian army has been funded at the subunit
level only; adequate training at the battle group and brigade levels is lacking.70
Doubts regarding the Sabre brigade were raised anew in August 2002, when it
was reported that DND had considered deploying it to Afghanistan as part of
Canada’s commitment to the U.S.-led war on terrorism.71 However (as noted be-
low), concern over the CF’s ability to maintain and operate the brigade, ac-
knowledged inability to provide adequate medical supplies, and insufficient
logistical support led to a decision to send a much smaller contingent. The con-
troversy has led to renewed speculation regarding the future of the brigade and
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the desirability of maintaining a “capability” that the Canadian Forces, in reality,
cannot exercise.
With regard to equipment, the army—perhaps not surprisingly, given its in-
ability to engage in high-intensity combat—must make do with a long list of
outdated weapon systems. Indeed, the army itself has provided the most damn-
ing critique of its capabilities. In a 1998 report, the Land Forces Command
noted that “the Army’s ‘core’ combat capability remains constrained by obsoles-
cent and obsolete 1960s and 1970s equipment that impose limitations on the
tasks that can be undertaken with acceptable risks and is becoming increasingly
expensive to operate and maintain.”72
The army’s primary combat weapon system remains the Leopard I main bat-
tle tank, acquired in the mid-1970s. While a sophisticated tank at the time it was
introduced, the Canadian Leopard has not been regularly upgraded; it is essen-
tially unchanged from the original model. With a (relatively) small 105 mm main
gun and no reactive armor, the Leopards are a marginal weapon at best on the
modern battlefield. Given the dramatic changes that have occurred in tank tech-
nology over the last twenty-five years, the Leopards would prove easy targets in
virtually any combat environment. They are presently, at last, getting badly
needed renovations, but few defense observers believe that they will be apprecia-
bly strengthened as a result.73
An additional army deficiency is the lack of tactical aviation. Unlike the
United States (with its AH-64 Apache), Canada has never owned a dedicated
attack helicopter. Instead, it assumes that allies will provide such capabilities.
Canadian army helicopters primarily perform reconnaissance and transport
missions.74 To accomplish such tasks, the army acquired in the mid-1990s a hun-
dred Griffon helicopters, a platform based on a commercial civilian
design (by Bell Helicopter). The program has been plagued by con-
troversy, uncertainty, and deficiencies that have been well docu-
mented.75 Indeed, in the summer of 2002, a quarter of the Griffon
fleet was temporarily grounded after a fatal accident in which a
tail-rotor blade disintegrated.76
There are too many additional army equipment deficiencies to list here. How-
ever, among the most glaring are the lack of an IFF (identification, friend or foe)
system to reduce the possibility of “friendly fire” accidents, limited mine-
detection and clearing capabilities, few intelligence assets, and an inadequate
capacity to decontaminate personnel in the event of exposure to nuclear, biolog-
ical, or chemical weapons.
Ironically, the incapability of Canadian land forces to wage high-intensity
warfare and their marginal utility in midlevel operations effectively reduce the
importance of army interoperability. A force has little need to ensure that its
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equipment and training allows seamless integration into a larger formation if it
cannot take part in most of that formation’s operations. As Joel Sokolsky has re-
cently noted, there are different levels of interoperability, of which the highest
(which he calls “a seamless fusion of military forces”) is required in “high in-
tensity combat operations.” For various LIC missions, Sokolsky argues, “a lower
level of interoperability [is] necessary.”77
This is not to suggest, however, that maintaining an interoperable land force is
not a professed goal of the Canadian army, for it clearly is. The value of comparable
training procedures and doctrines has been highlighted by the Canadian participa-
tion in the war in Afghanistan and the deployment there of 850 soldiers of Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. Prior to their arrival, the commander of the U.S.
forces in southern Afghanistan said that the integration of the two countries’
forces would be “seamless”;78 this characterization, defense analysts explained,
would result from common training practices.79 The Canadian troops left Afghani-
stan in July 2002, after only six months, but there is widespread acceptance that they
performed a valuable mission—primarily, assisting U.S. forces in capturing remain-
ing al-Qa‘ida and Taliban fighters and securing the Kandahar airport—and made a
major contribution to the larger war effort.80 The interoperability achieved in Afghan-
istan was the result of years of careful planning and reflected a strategic decision to
bring Canadian army operational procedures in line with those of the United States
(at least to the extent possible, given Canadian military weakness).81
As for modernization plans, a few army initiatives can be noted. The army is
taking some initial steps to develop a capacity to function on the emerging “digi-
tized” battlefield.82 The Iris Tactical Command, Control, and Communications
System consists of handheld and vehicle-mounted radios that will provide a se-
cure communications capability. Further, the Situational Awareness subsystem
will show unit commanders where all friendly and enemy vehicles are, with pin-
point accuracy.83 The army is also in the process of modernizing its armored
fighting vehicles, an important step in the creation of a more mobile force.84
With regard to plans to reshape the army, a study prepared in 2000, Army of
Tomorrow, outlined a blueprint for a transformed Canadian land force.85 The
document calls for a more technology-dependent army, utilizing advanced sen-
sors and precision weapons, and capable of participating in joint and combined
operations. Perhaps most critically, it calls for a much smaller force, with only
two brigades and a significantly reduced artillery corps.
An even more important army blueprint was released in May 2002 by the
service’s commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jeffrey. In a document titled
Advancing with Purpose, Jeffrey called for a radically reformulated Canadian
army, one that would be based around units of one hundred soldiers instead of
the present seven-hundred-man battalions.86 Jeffrey’s plan would create a
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much more flexible structure and would place considerable emphasis on the
readiness of light infantry and on command and communications functions.87
While the plan certainly represents a bold rethinking of the size and purpose of
the army, it is difficult to overstate the financial impetus behind it; as Jeffrey
has noted, “I don’t see a better way unless of course someone has got a lot more
money to build me a lot bigger army.”88
These initiatives aside, inadequate equipment, uncertain strategic goals, and
near-constant manpower reductions have produced a service in crisis, as many
have observed.89 For example, in 1999 the Conference of Defence Associations, a
pro-DND lobby group, stated that “the Canadian Forces, especially the army, are
on the verge of collapse.”90 As noted, the army itself has been surprisingly can-
did, accepting that it is in a “fragile” state, with erosion beginning to set in.91 In
short, the prognosis for the army is bleak. The emphasis on peacekeeping has re-
sulted in a force that can take part in only low-level combat, quite a contrast to
the role the Canadian army played in the last century’s two global conflicts.92
The Air Force
Like the army, the Canadian air force is battling equipment obsolescence and de-
clining capabilities. Recent engagements, particularly Operation ALLIED FORCE
over Kosovo in 1999 (the Canadian portion of which was called Operation
ECHO), demonstrated serious interoperability concerns, concerns that placed al-
lied aircraft and their crews in potential danger. Given the prohibitive cost of re-
placements for the ageing CF-18s, the limited roles that the present aircraft can
perform, and questionable political support, the air force also is a poor candi-
date for prioritization over the other services.93
The decline of the air force has been particularly dramatic since 1994. That
year’s white paper outlined a series of steps necessitated by the reduction in de-
fense spending. Most critically, expenditures on fighter forces and their support
were to be reduced by 25 percent. To achieve those savings, the air force was re-
quired to retire its CF-5 fleet, cut its fighter-related overhead, reduce annual au-
thorized flying hours, and scale back the number of operational CF-18s, the sole
remaining combat aircraft in its inventory.94 As a result, measured by the num-
ber of personnel (thirteen thousand), the air force today is the smallest it has
been since 1948.95
Canada’s 138 CF-18s were purchased in the early 1980s and are the original
A/B models produced by the American manufacturer McDonnell Douglas. A
second version of the plane, the C/D model, was produced in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and included a large number of improvements over the original. In
1998, the Boeing Corporation—having purchased McDonnell Douglas several
years earlier—began manufacturing the third variant of the aircraft, the E/F
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(nicknamed “Super Hornet”), a model that became operational in 2002.96 All
F-18s in the active inventory of the United States are already at the C/D stan-
dard and will be upgraded to E/F by mid-decade. In contrast, most CF-18s
have never been upgraded (although a current modernization program will
be examined below), with the result that many of their systems are approach-
ing obsolescence and are facing serious challenges in supportability and the
availability of spare parts.97
Canada’s CF-18s have taken part in two major conflicts in the last decade. In
the Gulf War, twenty-four CF-18s were deployed to perform defensive combat
air patrols; in the war’s later stages the aircraft also performed sweep and escort
missions—the first time since the Korean War that Canadian aircraft had been
involved in offensive air operations.98 In 1999, eighteen CF-18s were deployed to
Aviano, Italy, where they took part in ALLIED FORCE. Ca-
nadian aircraft played an active part in the bombing cam-
paign, one of only five Nato countries to do so (the others
being the United States, Britain, France, and Germany).99
With regard to Operation DESERT STORM, there were
numerous interoperability problems associated with the
CF-18. For example, Canadian aircraft were deficient in
tactical air communications equipment. Specifically, the
CF-18s lacked the Link-4 ship-to-aircraft datalink system,
necessary for secure transmissions with the Aegis antiair-
craft cruisers that guarded the coalition surface fleet. Until the problem was re-
solved by an upgrade arrangement negotiated with the United States, it
delayed Canadian engagements against hostile Iraqi aircraft.100
The Canadian sweep-and-escort missions in the Gulf raised two different sets
of problems. The first stemmed from a lack of secure voice radio communica-
tions, which forced a change in coalition bombing missions to higher altitudes
for greater protection against enemy missiles and artillery.101 The second prob-
lem was inadequate refuelling capability. At the onset of the operation Canada
deployed a refuelling aircraft, a converted Boeing 707 nicknamed “Husky One,”
to support the CF-18s. But after sixteen consecutive days of operation, the air-
craft was grounded due to hydraulic problems. This became a serious matter for
the CF-18s, as most of the coalition tankers in the region had nozzles that were
incompatible with CF-18 refuelling probes.102
Additional problems were experienced with the Canadian bombing effort.
Most critical was a lack of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Canadian
CF-18s had not been reconfigured to carry the new, more accurate ordnance and
as a result were limited to dropping “dumb” bombs against Iraqi artillery and ve-
hicle convoys.103 A further difficulty involved doctrinal differences and tactical-
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level training. For example, Canadian pilots had not been trained to perform
high-altitude bombing, a problem that was rectified only through extensive
training and exercises.
The air force spent the years following DESERT STORM addressing some of the
problems that had been identified, but there were some notable failures, with the
result that many of the same issues resurfaced during ALLIED FORCE in 1999. For
example, Canada (still) did not have a strategic air-to-air refuelling capability; it
was wholly dependent on the United States in this respect.104 Further, Canada
had acquired only a limited number of laser-guided PGMs prior to the cam-
paign;105 Canada did not acquire any satellite-guided munitions.106 In addition,
Canadian aircraft lacked night-vision devices and helmet-mounted bombsight
“cueing” systems, the absence of which degraded the safety of their maneuvering
and the effectiveness of their bombing. Most critically, Canada still had no secure
voice communications—it was the only Nato country that did not—a failing that
forced the entire allied air effort to use single-frequency (and thus jammable)
equipment.107 An air force assessment of the campaign concluded that “we could
not repeat the same level of activity, and in most scenarios we would not be per-
mitted to participate to the same extent, due to our increasingly outdated equip-
ment.”108
In 1999, with the CF-18s approaching the ends of their expected service lives
in five to ten years, the air force introduced a plan designed to keep the aircraft
flying until approximately 2020. The Incremental Modernization Program
(IMP) has a budget of eight hundred million dollars (U.S.) and is now well un-
der way. The project consists of ten independent ventures, including enhanced
computer capabilities, new electronic warfare systems, and an improved radar
suite.109 However, even after all the upgrades are completed (in 2008), the CF-18s
will have been brought up only to the operational standard the U.S. F-18s at-
tained almost twenty years ago. Even more worrisome, with the introduction of
the F-22 Raptor in the United States in 2005 and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in
2008 (and the expected gradual retirement of the F-18s), U.S. aircraft standards
will by then have been entirely transformed, well beyond the capability of the
CF-18s.110 In addition, the air forces of many of Canada’s allies will receive new
aircraft over the next decade, making effective cooperation increasingly un-
likely.111 Lastly, with price tags of ninety million dollars (U.S.) per aircraft for the
F-22 and about fifty million for the JSF, both aircraft will be far too expensive
for the CF to purchase (barring an unexpected and massive defense spending
increase).112
For transport, the air force has thirty-two turboprop CC-130 Hercules air-
craft. Their most important function is to carry cargo, but they can also be used
to carry passengers, and they have a marginal capability for aerial refuelling. The
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Hercules is also the principal fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft of the Cana-
dian Forces.113
In service since the 1960s (although some were purchased in the early 1970s),
the Hercules, like many other Canadian weapons platforms, are nearing the ends
of their operational lives. Indeed, DND recently acknowledged that only a third
of the fleet is available for daily operations; the majority require nearly continu-
ous repairs.114 The retirement of the Hercules will pose a particularly daunting
challenge, as these highly versatile aircraft have been depended upon for virtu-
ally all deployments of CF personnel abroad.
While a comprehensive modernization program could extend the life of the
Hercules force for perhaps ten years, a replacement aircraft will have to be pur-
chased in the next few years if DND is to maintain a transport capability past
2010. The obvious candidate is the C-130J Hercules, a modernized version of the
venerable aircraft. However, it costs about seventy million dollars (U.S.) per
plane and has cargo limitations; the government has to date not approved any
such purchase.115 A second possibility is a limited acquisition of more expensive
Boeing C-17 Globemasters, an aircraft that is now widely used by the U.S. Air
Force.116 Despite the cost of either option, purchasing a replacement aircraft for
the Hercules has become a top priority of DND; the 2001–2002 Report on Plans
and Priorities declares that “develop[ing] options to enhance [Canadian forces’]
deployability, including strategic lift” is a primary objective of force structure
modernization.117
Finally, despite attempts to emphasize the air force’s nonmilitary capabilities,
airpower runs inherently counter to the “soft power” view of the world that pre-
vails within the Liberal government, particularly the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs.118 As a result, the air force is unlikely to attract significant political support
any time soon.
The air force, then, is facing a difficult period. Its sole combat plane is verging
on obsolescence, it has no strategic lift capability to speak of, and its transport
aircraft are ageing and increasingly error prone. All this will seriously impede
the efforts of the Canadian air force to become functionally interoperable with
the U.S. Air Force. There is little question that in the opening stages of future
conflicts (as in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) the United States will
look to utilize its airpower, a capability that no prospective enemy can match. In-
deed, it has been recently observed that “across the spectrum of conflict, air su-
premacy is now the sine qua non of U.S. military activity, the arm of choice and
the enabler and protector of all other arms.”119 Thus Canada’s air weakness may
effectively negate its ability to participate in U.S.-led military operations.
Certainly, if it were up to DND, Canada would retain a sophisticated air com-
bat capability and would remain a potential air coalition partner of the United
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States. One could argue that the Incremental Modernization Program is de-
signed with precisely this in mind. However, if this is indeed the air force’s intent,
the IMP is not sufficient, nor is it apparent that any country of Canada’s size and
resources could do much better. Combat aircraft are presently undergoing a rev-
olution in terms of performance and capabilities, a transformation not experi-
enced since the late 1940s and early 1950s, when jet engines and air-to-air
missiles were first introduced. Only countries with large and sophisticated mili-
taries (the United States, Britain, France, Israel, and perhaps one or two others)
will now be able to field first-rate air forces.
Other nations are left with the options of either operating second-tier air
arms or concentrating on noncombat air missions (for example, command and
control or aerial surveillance). Given U.S. air superiority over both friends and
foes alike, the question needs to be asked: do allies of the United States need to
operate advanced combat aircraft? It is highly unlikely that any Western country
would feel obliged to go it alone against a prospective foe; fielding and maintain-
ing advanced combat aircraft in order to do so are now very demanding and ex-
pensive tasks. In any case, the choice will be difficult for Canada, a country with a
long and proud record of aerial service.120
Canadian CF-18s have played no part in the bombing campaign over Afghan-
istan. Their inability to operate from U.S. aircraft carriers was the official reason
given.121 An additional explanation, however, may have been that the United
States desired the assistance of only forces that would add appreciably to the
campaign.
The Navy
The navy is in the best shape of Canada’s three services, and it is the obvious can-
didate for prioritization. It enjoys relatively modern equipment, strong political
support, and a strategic mission that is broadly consistent with Canadian for-
eign policy goals. In addition, it has an excellent working relationship with the
U.S. Navy, perhaps the closest of any American ally. A decision to prioritize the
navy will not only allow it to purchase badly needed equipment but will ensure a
strong Canadian naval presence well into the future.
The navy’s major warships are twelve Halifax-class frigates, four Iroquois-
class destroyers, two fleet support vessels, and four submarines. In addition, it
operates a maritime aviation force of thirty Sea King helicopters and twenty-one
long-range patrol aircraft.122 Lastly, the navy has recently acquired twelve mari-
time coastal defense vessels.
The frigates are the pride of the fleet. Delivered between 1992 and 1998, they
can perform a variety of roles, depending on the circumstances, against under-
surface, surface, or air threats. A Halifax-class frigate can search some thirty-two
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thousand square kilometers (about 12,400 square miles) of ocean in about ten
days, before it requires refuelling.123 To detect and track submarines, and to ex-
tend the range of territory that the frigate is able to scout, each frigate carries one
Sea King helicopter (examined below). The frigates are quite heavily armed with an
array of missiles, guns, and defensive systems.
The destroyers, while hardly new (they were purchased in the early 1970s),
have been extensively modernized and refitted over the years and
are still effective warships. They have been outfitted with an
area-air-defense system by which they can extend protection to
other vessels—radars, an inventory of twenty-nine long-range
surface-to-air missiles, and chaff launchers. The destroyers have
also been fitted with command and control facilities that allow
them to serve as flagships for Canadian or allied task groups.124
This combination of modern air defense and command and con-
trol capabilities merited redesignation of these ships as guided
missile destroyers (DDGs). It should be noted, though, that the
destroyers are scheduled to be withdrawn from service at the end
of the decade.125
The navy’s Victoria-class submarines are in the process of being intro-
duced. Purchased (slightly used) from Britain in the mid-1990s, they offer an
enormous improvement over the now-withdrawn Oberon-class submarines,
which had been in service since 1963 and were effectively obsolete.126 While the
Russian navy does not pose the threat that the Soviet navy did during the Cold
War, it retains a substantial submarine force, which still patrols off the North
American coasts. The new submarines will provide valuable surveillance as well
as antisubmarine capabilities.127
Combined, these three warship classes offer Canada fairly robust presence
and significant combat capabilities. Furthermore, and critically, they offer a
high degree of interoperability with allied navies, and in particular the U.S.
Navy. Perhaps the best example of this is the ability of Canadian frigates and
destroyers to operate in U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Since the Gulf War,
Canadian warships have frequently been integrated into such groups.128 This
has occurred most recently with Operation APOLLO (the Canadian designa-
tion for its contribution to the U.S. war on terrorism), where six Canadian
warships—four frigates, one destroyer, and one supply ship—joined the
U.S.-led fleet.129 Extensive combined training allowed Canadian vessels to do so
quite easily, a degree of interoperability that is highly unusual in the naval
world.130
Among their naval allies, the Americans consider the Canadian navy “high
end.”131 With an emphasis on command and control along with intelligence and
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surveillance, it has a demonstrated ability to undertake a broad array of mis-
sions. The navy’s blueprint for the next several decades—a document entitled
Leadmark—notes that during the Gulf War the Canadian task group com-
mander was the only non-American warfare commander, a development that
was possible because of the compatibility and interoperability of Canadian ships
with those of the United States.132 Similarly, the upgraded destroyers and frigates
have frequently played leading roles in multilateral operations.133
In the area of maritime aviation, however, the navy is badly in need of mod-
ernization; these needs point to the advantages that naval prioritization would
offer. The navy’s maritime helicopter, the Sea King, is completely obsolete; it
poses a danger to both its crew and nearby ships virtually every time it flies
(which, given its enormous maintenance requirements, is thankfully not of-
ten).134 In service since 1963, Canada’s fleet of Sea Kings was initially slated for
replacement in the early 1990s. However, upon election in 1993, one of Prime
Minister Jean Chretien’s first official acts was to cancel the helicopter project
(and pay the hefty three-hundred-million-dollar U.S. cancellation fee). The
government announced its intention to replace the fleet in 2000;135 the time-
table, however, remains unclear, and the Sea Kings
will likely be flying until at least 2008.136 This is an
embarrassment not only to the crews who are forced
to keep these antiques in the air but more broadly to
all Canadians, who are apparently content to ask CF
naval aviators to fly aircraft that are poorly equipped,
occasionally unstable, and incapable of operating in
most combat environments.137
The other major naval aircraft is the CP-140 Au-
rora (an adaptation of the U.S. P-3 Orion), which is
also nearing the end of its operational life. In service since 1980, the Auroras per-
form an array of surveillance and reconnaissance missions, in addition to anti-
submarine warfare tasks. As a result, however, they have been operated hard.
Having exceeded the deadline set in the United States for their refurbishment,
the Auroras have problems with corrosion and structural fatigue. In addition,
the now-familiar Canadian practice of not upgrading aircraft has resulted in
service and maintenance difficulties.138
The problems associated with naval aviation notwithstanding, the Canadian
navy is in surprisingly good shape.139 Certainly, there is an element of luck involved;
it was the navy’s good fortune that it was the last service to undergo a major mod-
ernization program before the defense budget was effectively gutted in 1993. How-
ever, luck alone cannot explain the navy’s balanced force—for that, credit must be
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given to the navy’s senior officers, who designed a fleet approach that combines sev-
eral types of capabilities.
Another factor in the navy’s favor is the broad range of operations that naval
forces can perform. Leadmark divides naval functions into three basic roles—
military, diplomatic, and constabulary.140 Under military missions it lists com-
mand of the sea, sea control, sea denial, battlespace dominance, fleet-in-being, mar-
itime power projection, and maritime maneuver. Among diplomatic roles, it
identifies ten distinct missions, including preventive diplomacy, coercion, mari-
time interdiction, peace-support operations, civil military cooperation, and
humanitarian assistance. Lastly, constabulary tasks comprise another six func-
tions, among which are sovereignty patrols, aid to the civil power, search and
rescue, and disaster relief.
This lengthy list of functions makes the navy ideally suited to carry out Canadian
foreign policy. As noted earlier, contributing to international peace and security
through multilateral operations remains a primary foreign policy goal of Canada,
and among the three services the navy clearly offers the broadest array of capabili-
ties to carry out this mission. As evidence, the Canadian navy has frequently de-
ployed when regional or ethnic conflict is seen as
requiring Western intervention. Thus, in the re-
cent past, the navy has sailed to Southeast Asia to
support operations in East Timor and participated
in the embargo against Haiti; it is currently engaged
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as part of the
campaign in Afghanistan.141
Any decision to prioritize the navy would
have an immediately beneficial impact, as badly
needed modernization programs could then be
undertaken quickly. In addition, because the
navy’s primary warships are all relatively modern, replacement should not be an
issue for at least another ten years.142 Even then, a decision could be made simply
to retire (rather than replace) the destroyers. Lastly, given its impressive degree
of interoperability with the U.S. Navy, the Canadian navy is well positioned to
participate in a wide range of missions, from peace-support/humanitarian aid
to sophisticated conventional warfare.
ALONGSIDE THE BEST, AGAINST THE BEST?
The decline of Canadian military capabilities has occurred with the apparent
approval of much of the Canadian public. Defense commentators and what re-
mains of the Progressive Conservative and Alliance parties have strongly criti-
cized the Liberal government for its defense cuts.143 Nevertheless, the reality is
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that, as Canadians have repeatedly demonstrated, when it comes to proposed
government spending increases, defense simply does not fare very well in com-
parison to programs like health care or education.144
Nor does this seem likely to change in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. While the Canadian govern-
ment has pledged to pay more attention to security issues, there is no indication
that DND will be getting any significant infusion of cash as a result.145 Indeed,
since the attacks, not only has the government announced only minor increases
in defense spending (of the additional five billion [U.S.] allocated for security in
the 10 December 2001 federal budget, only eight hundred million spread over
five years was earmarked for defense), but it has also declared that a defense pol-
icy review needs to be undertaken—a sign, many observ-
ers believe, that the government is finally prepared to
acknowledge that the fiscal basis of the 1994 Defence
White Paper can no longer be met.146
If nothing else, though, 11 September has shifted pub-
lic attention to the Canadian military in a way not seen in
decades. The Canadian Forces have come under scrutiny
not for their misadventures but for their capabilities, and
the tools they have—and perhaps more importantly, do
not have—to perform the tasks that are requested of them. While it is difficult to
predict what might come of this newfound attention, it is worth noting that this
debate is taking place against a backdrop of studies and reports that allege that
Canada is a “declining” international power.147 If it is to reclaim its status as a
“middle” power, these analysts argue, it needs to start paying the expenditures in
defense that are expected of an advanced, Western country that is a longtime
member of Nato and a partner with the United States in the defense of North
America.148
DND must not only deal with antiquated equipment and inadequate funding
but battle a political establishment in Ottawa that appears to do everything pos-
sible to discredit it. In a recent example, Prime Minister Chretien stated in a
year-ending 2001 interview that people who call for increases in defense spend-
ing—who, it should be emphasized, include Canada’s auditor general as well as
members of his own party—are essentially pawns of the arms industry. As the
prime minister noted with his customary eloquence, “there is an industry that is
very important that produces armaments for government . . . that [says] you
should buy more of our stuff.”149 The prime minister went on to state that the
Canadian Forces are “well equipped” (a point he has made many times over the
last few years) and to suggest that DND’s troubles have more to do with outdated
strategies than with fiscal constraints.150
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There is no question, however, that years of budget cuts have left the CF in a
precarious position. Despite the goals set in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Can-
ada today cannot field military forces that can fight “alongside the best, against
the best.” Over the course of the past decade, the Canadian Forces have lost sig-
nificant combat capability; once lost, such capability is difficult to restore. As has
been recently noted, “Neither flexible nor multipurpose anymore, the Canadian
Forces, by gradual but incessant reductions, have been ushered in the direction
of the glorified sovereignty protection and peacekeeping roles its fiercer critics
had for a decade and more demanded.”151 Even the defense minister, John
McCallum, has begun to acknowledge the severity of the situation, recently as-
serting that the CF have been stretched past the “breaking point.”152
Nonetheless, Canadian foreign policy remains internationalist.153 While the
tenure of Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy has ended, his successors, John
Manley and, more recently, Bill Graham, have continued to stress the interna-
tional role that Canada can play.154 During much of the 1970s, the Liberal gov-
ernment’s emphasis on “human security” and “soft power” downplayed the
importance of military assets, thereby making them broadly consistent with
Canada’s declining capabilities. But those days seem to be (thankfully) over, as
Manley’s conception of foreign policy is far more de-
pendent on traditional “hard power” resources and rec-
ognizes the linkages between political influence and
military power. Indeed, Manley has even gone so far as to
suggest that if Canada wants to be taken more “seriously”
in world affairs, it needs to increase its military, an opin-
ion that would have verged on sacrilege in Ottawa just a
few years ago.155
Further, Canada’s foreign policy internationalism is
strongly supported by the public, a finding clearly sup-
ported by polling data. Respondents to one such poll apparently surprised re-
searchers with the depth of their understanding, leading pollsters to conclude
that “Canadians are passionate about world affairs, interventionist, and more
united than one might have predicted.”156 A majority of respondents indicated
they would consider a Canadian military response appropriate in the event of
another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or a Rwanda-type genocide in Africa.
The disconnect, then, between Canada’s foreign and defense policy is clear.
Simply stated, DND is incapable of fielding the forces required to match Can-
ada’s foreign policy rhetoric, and it is unlikely to acquire those forces in the fu-
ture. There are, however, steps that DND can take that will produce at least some
degree of combat capability. The army and air force suffer from advanced equip-
ment obsolescence; their prognoses for future interoperability are poor. On the
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other hand, the navy has a reasonably modern fleet, can perform a wide array of
missions, enjoys widespread political support, and already offers significant
interoperability capabilities. A decision to give it priority, fiscal and otherwise,
over the other services would give the Canadian Forces a significant capacity to
participate in multinational coalition operations well into the twenty-first
century.
Let us be clear, though. There is no satisfaction to be found in recommending
that the needs of the navy be prioritized over those of the army or air force. As
many observers have noted, the future strategic environment is uncertain, and
the varied types of threats that Canada faces calls for broadly capable armed
forces (like those envisioned by the 1994 Defence White Paper).157 In an ideal
world, Canadians and their government would take military matters seriously
and ensure that the Department of National Defence was funded to carry out the
tasks demanded of it. But Canada is not living in an ideal world, nor is it likely to
enjoy one any time soon. Military spending in Canada is likely to remain low.158
Accordingly, the government and DND must make some critical decisions.
There are indications that DND is beginning to appreciate the challenges and
is finally starting to ask the necessary difficult questions. In a sustainability re-
view conducted in November 2001, DND acknowledged that it was in a period
of “relentless decline” and that “major trade-offs” might have to be made to en-
sure that some advanced capabilities are maintained.159 “The current situation
cannot endure. Either corrective action is taken now, or Defence will gradually
become unable to meet its white paper commitments and respond to emerging
challenges.” Most importantly, the report suggested that DND must begin mak-
ing choices as to which capabilities it wishes to maintain—perhaps between
numbers of personnel and investment in high-technology weapons platforms;
between flexible, multipurpose forces and single-purpose “niche” forces; be-
tween preparation for domestic tasks and for international ones; and maintain-
ing equal capabilities for the army, navy, and air force versus putting more
resources into one service at the expense of the others. While the report made no
recommendation, it noted that the time for making decisions is short and that
the consequences of making the wrong ones would be severe.
The concept of trade-offs was also raised in At a Crossroads, the report re-
leased by General R. R. Henault, the chief of the Defence Staff, in June 2002. He
concluded that “[DND] cannot invest in the new capabilities required to trans-
form the CF and remain interoperable and well equipped without divesting our-
selves of capabilities that have become less relevant to the twenty-first-century
battlespace. The transition will be difficult.”160 He offered no details as to which
capabilities had become “less relevant,” but he documented the difficulties and
challenges that both the army and air force face, while offering little but praise
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for the navy—“ton for ton, the Canadian Navy is currently as capable as any navy
in the world.”161
A decision to prioritize Canada’s navy also makes sense on strategic grounds.
In this regard, the war on terrorism launched by the United States against the
Taliban and al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan in October 2001 has revealed interesting
changes in the way Western military operations are likely to be conducted in the
future. A new style of warfare employing small teams of special operations
forces on the ground supported by carrier-based and land-based aircraft may
well displace U.S. ground and tank forces on the battlefield.162 Four assets appear
to have been vital in the quick U.S. victory over the Taliban regime: special oper-
ations forces; long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers; “smart” weapons combined
with digital communications;163 and unmanned aerial vehicles, which now com-
bine reconnaissance capabilities with limited strike roles.164
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has revealed that the United States will carefully
screen multilateral participation in future coalitions. The Americans will likely wel-
come Canada’s participation in future naval task forces (provided its maritime
forces remain capable and fully interoperable) but are unlikely to request its air or
ground assets. At the very least, the campaign suggests that only countries that
maintain highly sophisticated air and ground units will be “allowed” to participate
in U.S.-led operations; Canada abandoned that standard some time ago.165
In essence, Canada possesses armed forces with a marginal combat capability
in the current strategic environment and little hope of becoming more combat
capable in the future, while at the same time its government places a premium
on interoperable forces that can take full advantage of the revolution in military
affairs. Nor is the emphasis on interoperability likely to diminish; on the con-
trary, interoperable forces will remain critical to both the United States and its
allies, especially in a coalition context.166 As Lawrence Freedman recently pre-
dicted, “The most important allies of the United States will make an effort to
stay abreast of [advanced military] technologies and to adopt them where possi-
ble, if only for purposes of interoperability. . . . It will become the subscription to
be taken seriously as an ally.”167
However, at least with regard to the United States, the need for inter-
operability in particular instances has more to do with American political con-
cerns than strategic ones. Without doubt, the United States has the military
assets required to conduct unilateral operations any time it perceives its national
interests to be at stake (as it is essentially doing in Afghanistan).168 But when core
American interests are not directly threatened—as in Kosovo or the Gulf—
Washington prefers to have allies on board before undertaking military opera-
tions.169 Former secretary of defense William Perry has suggested, “The threat of
military force . . . will be maximally effective when political conditions permit
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the military force to be a broadly based coalition.”170 But the primary criterion
for joining U.S.-led coalitions is fielding defense forces that are broadly inter-
operable with American forces; offers of forces that have failed to remain
interoperable will likely result in polite refusals—an understandable response,
given the risks. Simply put, the United States is not willing to allow its preference
for working with allies to weaken its own defense posture. If the allies—includ-
ing Canada—wish to cooperate with the U.S. military, they must ensure that
their capabilities are up to the challenge.171
The Canadian Forces have entered a critical period, one that will determine
their force structure for the next several decades. At a time of fiscal challenge
and dramatic technological change, continuing the present fiction of general-
purpose combat forces is no longer sustainable. The events of 11 September and
the resulting U.S.-led war on terrorism have highlighted the importance of a
modern and capable military. The Department of National Defence needs to
prioritize if it is to retain a viable fighting force. To be sure, such decisions will
not be easy; they could spark internecine struggle within the military. Failure to
make them, however, would largely ensure that the present disconnect between
Canadian foreign and defense policy will become a permanent fixture of Cana-
dian statehood.
N O T E S
1. While a topic of some controversy as recently
as the mid-1990s, it is now widely accepted
that an RMA is under way. Key studies include
Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” For-
eign Affairs, March/April 1996; Lawrence
Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,
Adelphi Paper 318 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies [hereafter IISS],
1998); Michael O’Hanlon, Technological
Change and the Future of Warfare (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000);
and Admiral William Owens, Lifting the Fog
of War (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux,
2000).
2. In general, Canadian defense white papers are
completed every ten to twenty years, or when
global conditions change in dramatic and un-
expected ways. Over the last forty years, there
have been four such papers in Canada—1964,
1971, 1987, and 1994. The intent is to offer a
general guideline of defense policy for the Ca-
nadian government, a framework for strategy
and major procurement programs. Doug
Bland has reprinted all post–World War II
defense white papers and released them in
one volume. See Doug Bland, ed., Canada’s
National Defence, vol. 1, Defence Policy
(Kingston, Ont.: School of Policy Studies,
Queen’s University, 1997).
3. The three services of the CF are officially
known as Land Forces Command (the army),
Maritime Command (the navy), and Air
Command (the air force), the result of a
departmental reorganization created during
the divisive service-unification debate of the
mid-1960s. (Land Forces Command is a
more recent incarnation, the name having re-
placed “Mobile Command.”) This article will
use the old service designations, a practice
popular within the CF.
4. The Canadian Defence Planning Document,
published by DND, identifies the fundamen-
tal missions of the CF. According to the 1997
report, contributing to international peace
and security, which includes participating in
R I C H T E R 9 3
27
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
a “full range” of multilateral operations, is
one of the CF’s primary defense roles. Simi-
larly, according to the more recent Report on
Plans and Priorities, 2001–2002 (Ottawa: De-
partment of National Defence [hereafter
DND], 2001), “Canada has an obligation to
contribute to international peace and security
through organizations like the United Na-
tions and [Nato]” (p. 2). For a recent look at
Canada’s participation in multilateral opera-
tions, see Doug Bland, “Canada and Military
Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom?”
Institute for Research on Public Policy Policy
Matters, February 2002.
5. This is not to suggest, though, that all of the
military services have embraced change with
equal enthusiasm. As Admiral William
Owens, former vice chairman of the U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has pointed out, the
RMA threatens vested interests throughout
the military, and it remains to be seen how
open each of the services are to change; see
Owens, Lifting the Fog of War; also see Elinor
Sloan, The United States and the Revolution in
Military Affairs (Ottawa: DND, Directorate of
Strategic Analysis, 1998). A recent article ex-
amines how the U.S. Army is responding to
the challenge and the inertia that must be
overcome to design an entirely novel struc-
ture. See Peter J. Boyer, “A Different War: Is
the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” New Yorker,
1 July 2002.
6. Colin Gray has suggested that the fascination
with technology lies at the heart of American
strategic culture; see his Nuclear Strategy and
National Style (London: Hamilton Press,
1986). For a more general discussion on stra-
tegic culture, see Peter Katzenstein, ed., The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Iden-
tity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1996).
7. In February 2002, the U.S. Department of
Defense submitted its budget request for the
2003 fiscal year. The total amount requested,
$379 billion, represented a thirty-nine-billion-
dollar increase (11 percent) over the 2002
budget; see “Huge Increase in Defence Spend-
ing,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 February 2002.
For recent reviews of U.S. defense develop-
ments, see Michael O’Hanlon, “Rumsfeld’s
Defense Vision,” Survival, Summer 2002, and
Lawrence J. Korb, “Are U.S. Forces
Unprepared and Underfunded?” Naval War
College Review, Spring 2002.
8. See David Gombert, “Right Makes Might:
Freedom and Power in the Information Age,”
McNair Paper 59 (Washington, D.C.: Insti-
tute for National Strategic Studies, May
1998), and David Gombert, Richard Kugler,
and Martin Libicki, Mind the Gap: Promoting
a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ.,
1999).
9. Gombert, Kugler, and Libicki, p. 12. This is
not to suggest that there are no internation-
ally competitive European and Canadian
technology or defense firms but rather that
their total number pales in comparison to
those based in the United States. Major Euro-
pean and Canadian technology firms include
Nokia, Ericsson, Nortel, and Alcatel; major
defense firms include British Aerospace, the
European Aeronautic Defense and Space
Company (EADS), and Bombardier. Mea-
sured by either revenue or market capitaliza-
tion, these firms are smaller than their
American counterparts (including IBM,
Microsoft, and Intel for the former category,
and Boeing and Lockheed Martin for the
latter).
10. Among the European Nato allies, only Greece
and Turkey spend over 3 percent of their
gross national products on defense, while
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, and Spain all spend below 2 percent.
One useful method of comparing defense in-
vestment and preparedness among countries
is to examine how much each country spends
per soldier. Using this criterion, the United
States spends about $180,000, the European
Nato allies on average about $110,000 (a fig-
ure brought down by the large militaries in
some European countries), and Canada
about $120,000. Further, the United States
spends about thirty billion dollars per year
on advanced military information systems
and in research and development for new
defense-related technologies, three times the
comparable European figure. See Richard
Medley, “Europe’s Next Big Idea: Strategy
and Economics Point to a European Mili-
tary,” Foreign Affairs, September/October
1999, and Ethan B. Kapstein, “Allies and Ar-
maments,” Survival, Summer 2002.
9 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
11. Between 1992 and 2000, Nato European de-
fense spending declined by 22 percent in real
terms; the reduction in specific countries,
most notably Germany and Spain, was far
greater. For a discussion of the United
States–Europe spending gap, see Malcolm
Chalmers, “The Atlantic Burden-Sharing De-
bate: Widening or Fragmenting?” Interna-
tional Affairs, no. 3, 2001. As for defense
spending developments since 11 September,
the French government recently announced
that it would increase spending by only 3.8
percent in the next fiscal year. See “France to
Spend 3.8% More on Defence,” Jane’s Online,
8 August 2002 (www.jdw.janes.com).
12. As former U.S. secretary of defense William
Cohen has noted, “NATO [European] coun-
tries spend roughly 60% of what the United
States does and they get about 10% of the ca-
pability. That has to change.” Cited in David
S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and
the European Union,” Survival, Winter
2000–2001.
13. Kapstein, p. 143.
14. See Yost and “Lessons from Kosovo: Military
Operational Capabilities,” in The Military
Balance 1999–2000 (London: IISS, 1999). The
British and French governments have pro-
duced their own studies on the capabilities
gap; see, respectively, the Secretary of State
for Defence, Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis
(London: Ministry of Defence, 1999), and
Ministère de la Defense, Les Enseignements du
Kosovo (Paris: Delegation a l’Information,
1999). In January 2000, Lord George Robert-
son, the Nato secretary general, offered a dev-
astating critique of European defense
capabilities: “The Kosovo air campaign dem-
onstrated just how dependent the European
allies had become on United States military
capabilities. From precision guided weapons
and all weather aircraft to ground troops that
can get to the crisis quickly[,] . . . [Europe]
did not have enough of the right stuff. . . .
Something is wrong, and Europe knows it.”
Cited in Yost, p. 99.
15. The current European defense debate is tak-
ing place against the backdrop of the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), a
pan-European force that should number sixty
thousand personnel by 2003. For a discus-
sion, see Alexander Moens, “Developing a
European Intervention Force,” International
Journal, Spring 2000, and Philip H. Gordon,
“Their Own Army? Making European De-
fence Work,” Foreign Affairs, July/August
2000.
16. See “United States Worried by Coalition
‘Technology Gap,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28
July 1998.
17. For a recent review of the difficulties involved
in forging multilateral coalitions, see James P.
Thomas, The Military Challenges of Transat-
lantic Coalitions, Adelphi Paper 333 (London:
IISS, 2000).
18. Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs,
“The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of
Interoperability: The Issues,” Institute for Re-
search on Public Policy Policy Matters, June
2002, p. 20.
19. See “NATO: United States Should Share
Technology,” Washington Post, 2 February
2002. Also see “The End of NATO? Europe
Had Better Catch Up,” New York Times, 4
February 2002.
20. George Robertson, “Can Europe Keep Up
with the Revolution in Military Affairs?”
RUSI Journal, April–May 1999.
21. Elinor Sloan, The Defence Capabilities Initia-
tive and United States-NATO Relations: Re-
sponding to the Revolution in Military Affairs,
Research Note 99/07 (Ottawa: DND, Direc-
torate of Strategic Analysis, 1999), p. 12. Also
see Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Af-
fairs, p. 72.
22. This prospect was discussed by Lieutenant
General Michael Short in testimony before
the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in
October 1999. General Short said that in the
future the United States may say to its allies,
“We will take the alliance to war and we will
win this thing[,] . . . but the price to be paid is
we call the tune.” See “General Wanted
United States to Call the Shots in Kosovo”
(London) Times, 27 January 2000. The gen-
eral’s remarks may have been linked to lin-
gering American frustration at how the war
in Kosovo had been prosecuted and the re-
straining influence that the allies (and in par-
ticular France) had had over the selection of
targets. For a review of the conflict, see An-
thony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons and
Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Cam-
paign in Kosovo” (Washington, D.C.: Center
R I C H T E R 9 5
29
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
for Strategic and International Studies, 1999),
and Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War
for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assess-
ment (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001).
On American-French disagreements on tar-
get selection, see “France Acted as Group
Skeptic,” Washington Post, 20 September
1999, and “U.S. Military Acted outside NATO
Framework during Kosovo Conflict, France
Says,” New York Times, 11 November 1999.
23. Ronald J. Diebert, “Uploading the ‘Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs’: War, Peace and Se-
curity in the Hypermedia Environment”
(paper presented at the 2002 International
Studies Association meeting, New Orleans,
March 2002), p. 5. In July 2002, the Canadian
and U.S. governments announced the creation
of five new integrated cross-border enforce-
ment teams, including police, immigration,
and customs officers. See “Canada, United
States Beef Up Border Security Teams,” Ot-
tawa Citizen, 23 July 2002.
24. The announcement of the command has at-
tracted considerable attention in Canada,
as the commander of NorthCom will also
serve as the head of NORAD. While Canada
is unlikely to be asked to participate formally
in its planning or command structure,
NorthCom’s very existence will emphasize
the necessity of rapid response to potential
security threats. Indeed, the news release an-
nouncing the command noted that the com-
mander would have the task of “security
cooperation and military coordination” with
other nations; see U.S. Dept. of Defense,
“Unified Command Plan,” News Release
188-0, 17 April 2002; Kim Burger, “United
States Unified Command Plan: The ‘Most
Significant Reform’ in 60 Years,” Jane’s De-
fence Weekly, 24 April 2002; and “Plans for
Closer Ties with U.S. Stalled,” National Post,
30 April 2002. In August 2002, Canada’s vice
chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. Gen. George
Macdonald, testified before a Canadian Sen-
ate committee that while no Canadian forces
will be assigned to NorthCom, the new com-
mand will coordinate the response to any fu-
ture continental security threat; see “Canada
Won’t Join Land-Sea Force,” Ottawa Citizen,
15 August 2002. Shortly after this testimony,
reports circulated that a binational “planning
group” was being negotiated, one that would
oversee the integration of one country’s
troops under the other country’s command
authority in the event of a terrorist attack; see
“Canada, U.S. Near Troop Deal,” Globe and
Mail, 28 August 2002.
25. In 1999 alone, the U.S. Air Force produced
more than eighty directives, instructions,
pamphlets, and planning documents on
interoperability. Samuel J. Walker, “Inter-
operability at the Speed of Sound: Modern-
izing the CF-18 Hornet,” in Over Here and
Over There: Canada-United States Defence
Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability, ed.
David G. Haglund (Kingston, Ont.: Queen’s
Quarterly and the Conference of Defence As-
sociations Institute, 2001), p. 252.
26. Myron Hura et al., Interoperability: A Con-
tinuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000), p. 7.
27. As cited in ibid., p. xiii.
28. Ibid., p. 7.
29. National Research Council, Realizing the Po-
tential of C4I: Fundamental Challenges
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1999), p. 65. Joel Sokolsky has noted a third
type of interoperability, “political/cultural,”
which “examines why and how each country
conducts military operations the way it does.”
See “Sailing in Concert: The Politics and
Strategy of Canada–United States Naval
Interoperability,” Institute for Research on
Public Policy Choices, April 2002, p. 8. The
original reference is to Kenneth Gause, “U.S.
Interoperability with Its High-End Allies”
(paper written for the Center for Strategic
Studies, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington,
Virginia, 2001).
30. National Research Council, p. 65.
31. Ibid., pp. 65–7.
32. Middlemiss and Stairs, p. 11.
33. Ibid., p. 12.
34. National Research Council, p. 69.
35. Hura et al., pp. 17–21.
36. Middlemiss and Stairs, p. 12.
37. Ibid., p. 13. For an Argentine view of these
advantages and other considerations, see Juan
Carlos Neves, “Interoperability in Multina-
tional Coalitions: Lessons from the Persian
Gulf War,” Naval War College Review, Winter
1995, pp. 50–62.
9 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
38. Middlemiss and Stairs, p. 13.
39. The most widely cited such study was written
by R. B. Byers, who in 1986 emphasized the
CF’s “commitment-capability gap.” See “Ca-
nadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and
the Challenges,” Adelphi Paper 214 (London:
IISS, 1986). Other major reports critical of
the CF’s capabilities included Gerald Porter,
In Retreat: The Canadian Forces in the Tru-
deau Years (Ottawa: Deneau and Greenberg,
1978), and Joel Sokolsky and Joseph Jockel,
“Canada: The Not So Faithful Ally,” Wash-
ington Quarterly, Fall 1984.
40. This was the primary recommendation of a
group organized by the University of Toronto.
See Canada 21: Canada and Common Security
in the Twenty-first Century (Toronto: Univ. of
Toronto Centre for International Studies,
1994).
41. DND, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1994), p. 14.
42. In June 1996, the U.S. military’s blueprint on
advanced technology for the military was re-
leased. Joint Vision 2010 identified four con-
cepts that were expected to dominate the
future battlefield—“dominant maneuver,”
“precision engagement,” “full dimensional
protection,” and “focused logistics.” See Gen-
eral John Shalikashvilli, Joint Vision 2010
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,
1996). In 2000, DoD’s follow-up document,
Joint Vision 2020: America’s Military—Pre-
paring for Tomorrow, was published. While
not significantly different from the earlier
study, the new report emphasized the need
for “full spectrum dominance,” which is to be
achieved through application of the four con-
cepts identified in JV 2010.
43. DND’s budget was reduced from eight billion
dollars (U.S.) in 1993–94 to $6.2 billion
(U.S.) in 1998–99, a drop of almost 25 per-
cent. While the budget has since increased
back up to eight billion, defense spending,
adjusted for inflation, remains below what it
was almost ten years ago. In the most recent
federal budget, tabled on 10 December 2001,
defense spending was increased. However,
the additional amount—eight hundred mil-
lion dollars (U.S.) spread over five years—
will not have a significant effect; for example,
only two hundred million is dedicated to cap-
ital spending. In recent years, a chorus of
politicians, defense officials, and observers
have called for major increases in military
spending. In the most recent such example,
in May 2002, the House of Commons De-
fence Committee argued that DND required
a further twelve billion dollars (U.S.) over
three years to modernize equipment and con-
tribute to international peace and security;
see “Parties Agree: Military Needs $18 Bil-
lion,” National Post, 31 May 2002. Even Can-
ada’s auditor general, Sheila Fraser, has
testified before Parliament that additional
funding is required, stating that with every
successive budget cut each service of the CF
has “tried to perpetuate itself in an ever-
leaner fashion.” See “We Stand on Guard,
Barely,” Ottawa Citizen, 22 December 2001.
Also see Sharon Hobson, “Canadian Govern-
ment Urged to Review Defence, Boost
Spending,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 Novem-
ber 2001.
44. DND, Shaping the Future of Canadian De-
fence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: DND,
1999), p. 6.
45. Ibid., p. 10.
46. David Haglund, “Strategy 2020 and the Ques-
tion of ‘Continentalism,’” in Over Here and
Over There, p. 37.
47. Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Strategic Ca-
pability Planning (www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/
dda/strat/forward_e.asp).
48. R. R. Henault, At a Crossroads (Ottawa:
DND, 2002), p. 26.
49. For a general discussion in the Canadian con-
text, see Middlemiss and Stairs, and Sharon
Hobson, “Canada Aims for Defense Inter-
operability with United States,” International
Defence Review, January 2001. Also see
Interoperability: The Challenge in 2010 (www
.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/analysis/challenge_e.asp).
Interoperability remains a key goal of the U.S.
military. In October 1999, the Pentagon cre-
ated the Directorate of Interoperability to
oversee all interoperability activities and
concerns.
50. A “niche” RMA strategy is one in which a
country decides to focus on one type of de-
fense force or capability (for example, logisti-
cal support) and effectively abandon—or at a
minimum, downplay—other types of forces.
Several commentators have argued that it is
R I C H T E R 9 7
31
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
only by pursuing single areas of capability
that most U.S. allies will be able to cooperate
effectively with American military forces. For
a discussion in the Nato context, see David
W. Read [Col.], “The Revolution in Military
Affairs: NATO’s Need for a Niche Capability
Strategy,” Canadian Military Journal, Au-
tumn 2000.
51. See my “The American Revolution? The Re-
sponse of Advanced Western States to the
Revolution in Military Affairs,” National Se-
curity Studies Quarterly, Autumn 1999, and
The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Im-
pact on Canada: The Challenge and the Conse-
quences, Working Paper 28 (Vancouver, B.C.:
Institute of International Relations, Univ. of
British Columbia, 1999). A recent book that
examines the RMA’s implications for Canada
is Elinor Sloan, The Revolution in Military Af-
fairs: Implications for Canada and NATO
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press,
2002).
52. The primary DND document on the RMA is
Canadian Defence beyond 2010: The Way
Ahead (Ottawa: RMA Operational Working
Group, DND, 1999). The report summarizes
the findings of a DND-sponsored symposium
held in the fall of 1998.
53. Gary Garnett [Vice Adm.], “The Canadian
Forces and the Revolution in Military Affairs:
A Time for Change,” Canadian Military Jour-
nal, Spring 2001, p. 7.
54. Elinor Sloan, “Canada and the Revolution in
Military Affairs: Current Response and Fu-
ture Opportunities,” Canadian Military Jour-
nal, Autumn 2000, p. 9.
55. See “Military Plans Rapid Reaction Force to
Respond to Global Crises,” National Post, 14
January 2000.
56. The same cannot be said for members of the
Canadian civilian defense community. Sev-
eral reports have criticized both the govern-
ment and DND for failing to make decisions
necessitated by Canada’s small defense bud-
get; see, for example, Joseph Jockel, The Ca-
nadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power
(Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic
Studies, 1999); David Bercuson et al., To Se-
cure a Nation: Canadian Defence and Security
in the 21st Century (Calgary, Alta.: Centre for
Military and Strategic Studies, Univ. of Cal-
gary, 2001); and most recently, Jack
Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in
Advance: Canada–United States Defence Re-
lations Past, Present, and Future,” Border Pa-
pers (published by the C. D. Howe Institute),
June 2002. There are indications, however,
that DND may no longer be willing to accept
the current situation silently. In the June
2002 report At a Crossroads, the department
acknowledged that “the status quo is not sus-
tainable.” See “Military Pushed to Its Limit,
Chief of Defence Staff Says,” National Post, 11
July 2002.
57. In the 1994 Defence White Paper, the Cana-
dian Forces were to maintain a full-time
strength of sixty thousand personnel; by 2002
its strength had fallen at least 10 percent be-
low that figure. Canada’s auditor general re-
cently reported that the military’s current
actual strength is closer to fifty-two thousand,
because three thousand positions are “va-
cant” and another five thousand personnel
have been designated as “non-effective” due
to medical reasons, maternity leave, or pend-
ing retirement; see “Forces Personnel Woes
Will Only Worsen,” Halifax Herald, 17 June
2002. In recent years there have been numer-
ous calls for an enlarged CF, most recently
from the Senate Committee on National Se-
curity and Defence, which has suggested that
the CF be increased to seventy-five thousand
personnel.
58. In the 1990s, two domestic CF deployments
attracted more attention than any prior inter-
national engagement since the Second World
War. In 1997, about eight thousand person-
nel were sent to Manitoba to help fix dikes
and evacuate people threatened by a series of
devastating floods. The following year, six-
teen thousand personnel were sent to parts of
Ontario and Quebec after an ice storm—the
largest operational deployment since 1945.
59. It is now fairly common for foreign observers
to state that the Canadian Forces have become,
in fact if not in practice, peacekeeping forces.
In 1997 Lt. Gen. Sir Hew Pike, of the British
army, declared that “the Canadians have sur-
rendered any claim to be a war-fighting force.
Their army . . . is now really just a peacekeep-
ing force.” Cited in Martin Shadwick, “British
Candour, Harsh Reality,” Canadian Defence
Quarterly, Winter 1997, p. 34.
60. For Axworthy’s perspective on these develop-
ments, see “Canada and Human Security:
9 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
The Need for Leadership,” International Jour-
nal, Spring 1997. For a more critical look at
Axworthy’s policies, see Dean Oliver and Fen
Hampson, “Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical As-
sessment of the Axworthy Doctrine,” Interna-
tional Journal, Summer 1998.
61. Recent Canadian peacekeeping missions have
included the UN Assistance Mission in
Rwanda (UNAMIR), the Nato Implementa-
tion Force in the former Yugoslavia (IFOR),
the Nato Stabilization Force in Bosnia
(SFOR), the UN Support Mission in Haiti
(UNTMIH), and the UN Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL). For details on current
Canadian peacekeeping missions, see the
DND Website, “Peace Support Operations”
(www.dnd.ca/admpol/org/dg_is/d_pk).
62. Since 1998 there has been increased aware-
ness of the manpower strain created by
peacekeeping commitments. For example,
Canada’s peacekeeping deployments to East
Timor and Kosovo both had to be scaled
back. Much of the difficulty results from the
Canadian commitment to maintain 1,700
troops, or one enlarged battle group, in
Bosnia. However, in reality two other battle
groups are effectively committed as well—
one in workup, the other newly returned
and retraining. Given the army’s small size—
it has a deployable infantry of about eight
thousand soldiers—this is a substantial re-
sponsibility; see “Imagine a Canadian Bri-
gade,” National Post, 23 October 2001. In July
2002, DND announced that it would reduce
its Bosnian commitment by three hundred
soldiers, a decision widely viewed as necessary
given the army’s limited size and resources;
see “Canada to Reduce Its Presence in
Bosnia,” DND News Release, 15 July 2002.
This announcement was followed up in No-
vember 2002, when Defence Minister John
McCallum said that the Canadian Bosnian
mission would end by 2007, a result of the
“struggles and strains” the Canadian military
faces. See “End Seen to Bosnian Mission,”
Toronto Star, 11 November 2002.
63. See Steven Metz and James Kievit, “The Rev-
olution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short
of War,” July 1994, on the U.S. Army War
College Website at www.army.mil/usassi/
ssipubs; and my The Revolution in Military
Affairs and Its Impact on Canada, pp. 40–4.
64. Jockel, p. 38.
65. Ibid., pp. 38–42.
66. R. L. Bowes, “SABRE Brigade Group in 2010:
A Command Imperative” (paper prepared for
the Canadian Forces College, 1997).
67. Jockel, p. 46.
68. The phrase “entire focus” was used by Can-
ada’s army commander, Lieutenant General
G. M. Reay, in a 1994 letter; see ibid., p. 46.
69. If the Sabre brigade were deployed, the Her-
cules would be the primary aircraft to trans-
port it. However, the Hercules can carry
neither the ten-ton trucks that are the main-
stay of the army nor its M109 howitzers or
Leopard tanks; see Jockel, pp. 61–2. The inad-
equacies of Canada’s strategic lift capabilities
were highlighted in January 2002 when the
850 troops committed to the U.S. war in Af-
ghanistan were unable to get to the theater. In
desperation DND considered chartering Rus-
sian transport planes; see “Ottawa Locking in
Plans for Afghan Mission,” Toronto Star, 24
January 2002. After much political wrangling,
Canadian troops were ferried to Afghanistan
by U.S. transport aircraft in February.
70. A “battle group,” a force of roughly a thou-
sand personnel, is based on either an infantry
battalion or an armored regiment. Canadian
army doctrine states that a battle group is
normally part of a brigade. For a discussion
of the lack of training in the Canadian mili-
tary, see Jockel, p. 52.
71. See “Canada Scaled Back War Effort,” Ottawa
Citizen, 10 August 2002.
72. Land Forces Development Guide 1998 (Ot-
tawa: Land Force Command, 1998), p. 7.
73. The ninety-million-dollar (U.S.) upgrade will
give the Leopards a thermal imaging sight
and a new weapons control system. Among
the critics of the program is David Rudd, ex-
ecutive director of the Canadian Institute of
Strategic Studies, who has stated that the up-
graded tanks will still be “outgunned” on the
battlefield. See “$140 Million Upgrade of
Tanks Called Waste,” National Post, 23 No-
vember 1999.
74. The Griffons perform a range of other func-
tions as well. The helicopters have been used
to conduct surveillance, search and rescue,
and medical evacuation, as well as to assist ci-
vilian authorities. See Sloan, The Revolution
in Military Affairs, p. 135.
R I C H T E R 9 9
33
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
75. For example, the Griffon has inadequate lift
capability, and its reconnaissance and com-
munications platforms are very limited. DND
has acknowledged some of these shortcom-
ings, for instance that the Griffon cannot op-
erate effectively in “icing conditions” (hardly
a rare circumstance in Canada); see the DND
Website, “Equipment: Vehicles—Griffon”
(www.army.dnd.ca/LF/equip/veh/Griffon).
The Griffon’s weaknesses have also been dis-
cussed in several auditor general reports.
76. The accident occurred during a search and
rescue mission in Labrador; the helicopter
had not been designed to operate in harsh
weather; see “‘Antiquated’ Choppers Put Res-
cue Crews at Risk, Author Says,” Ottawa Citi-
zen, 26 July 2002. Also see “Tail Blades
Defective,” Halifax Herald Limited, 15 August
2002.
77. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 9.
78. See “Canadians, Americans One Army, Offi-
cer Says,” Globe and Mail, 18 January 2002.
79. See “Canadians Will Mesh Smoothly with
American Troops in Afghanistan, Analysts,”
Canoe News (www.canoe.com), 14 January
2002.
80. The United States requested that the Cana-
dian troops remain for an additional six-
month term; the request was rejected because
it would have stretched the army too thin,
given its other commitments; see Sharon
Hobson, “Canada Will Not Replace Afghan
Battle Group,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 May
2002. American admiration of the role per-
formed by the PPCLI was made clear by the
decision to recommend three Canadian snip-
ers for a Bronze Star, for meritorious conduct
in a combat zone. See “Get Moving on
Snipers’ Medals, U.S. Officer Says,” National
Post, 3 May 2002. On the question of the role
the CF played in Afghanistan, in November
2002 reports surfaced that the Canadian mis-
sion had been plagued by poor planning and
inadequate equipment. See “Afghanistan
Mission Lacked ‘Timely Direction,’” Ottawa
Citizen, 9 November 2002.
81. See Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in
Advance.”
82. These Canadian programs have been necessi-
tated by the U.S. plan known as “Army XXI”
for an advanced land force, elements of which
could be deployed before the end of the de-
cade. See General Dennis J. Reimer, “The
Army after Next: Revolutionary Transforma-
tion,” Strategic Review, Spring 1999; Michele
Zanini and Jennifer Morrison Taw, The Army
and Multilateral Force Compatibility (Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000); and Walter
Perry, Bruce Pirnie, and John Gordon IV,
The Future of Warfare: Issues from the 1999
Army after Next Study Cycle (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 2001).
83. Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs, p.
128.
84. The army has recently acquired approxi-
mately two hundred Coyote reconnaissance
vehicles and is in the midst of purchasing 360
LAV III light armored vehicles. The Coyotes
in particular have attracted considerable posi-
tive comment, and there is speculation that
the United States may be considering them as
well. For a review of the Coyote program, see
R. F. Carruthers [Lt. Col.], “Coyote: Cana-
dian Army Reconnaissance into the Next Cen-
tury,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring
1998. The new vehicles are replacing Grizzly
and tracked M113A1 armored personnel car-
riers, both of which are being phased out of
service.
85. See “‘Army of Tomorrow’ Would Employ
Fewer Soldiers,” National Post, 6 April 2000.
86. Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy
(Ottawa: Land Force Command, 2002).
87. See “General Pushes Plan for Major Army
Overhaul,” Toronto Star, 10 May 2002. In a
speech outlining the proposal, Jeffrey said,
“We do not have and probably will not have
all of the resources required to address all of
our problems.” Also see Sharon Hobson,
“Canadian Infantry Comes Out on Top in
Restructure,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 May
2002.
88. “General Pushes Plan for Major Army
Overhaul.”
89. In 2002, a series of news stories alerted the
Canadian public to the extent of the man-
power problem. See, for example, “Canada’s
Serious Troop Shortage,” Edmonton Journal,
24 May 2002, and “Army Stretched Past
Limit for Foreign Missions,” Edmonton Jour-
nal, 13 May 2002.
1 0 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
34
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
90. See “Forces in Dire Straits, Claims Lobby
Group,” National Post, 19 November 1999.
91. These comments were made by Lieutenant
General Jeffery. See “Canada’s Troops Fight
Budget Battle,” Toronto Star, 26 January
2002.
92. See, for example, J. L. Granatstein, The Gen-
erals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Com-
manders in the Second World War (Toronto:
Stoddart, 1993), and R. J. Steel, The Men Who
Marched Away: Canada’s Infantry in World
War I, 1914–1918 (St. Catherines, Ont.:
Vanwell, 1990).
93. Since it entered office in 1993, the Chretien
government has viewed airpower as perform-
ing much the same role it did during the Cold
War, despite the political and strategic changes
in the post–Cold War environment. See Kim
Richard Nossal, “Air Power and Canadian
Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era,” in
Air Power at the Turn of the Millennium, ed.
David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Andre Beau-
regard (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Stra-
tegic Studies, 1999).
94. 1994 Defence White Paper, p. 48. The white
paper recommended reducing the opera-
tional CF-18 force to between forty-eight and
sixty aircraft; the higher figure has been
adopted.
95. By way of comparison, the air force had
23,500 personnel as recently as 1989. David
Kinsman [Lt. Gen.], “The Future of the Ca-
nadian Air Force,” in Air Power at the Turn of
the Millennium, p. 8.
96. For a discussion of the “Super Hornet,” see
John A. Tirpak, “The Three Fighters,” Air
Force Magazine, July 2001. Also see “All-in-
One Super Hornet Flies Off to Test Its Sea
Legs,” San Diego Union Tribune, 24 July 2002.
97. Walker, p. 255.
98. For a general overview of Canada’s Gulf War
experience, see Jean Morin and Richard
Gimblett, Operation Friction, 1990–1991: The
Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 1997).
99. Canadian CF-18s flew a total of 678 combat
sorties during the Kosovo conflict. In addition,
Canadian aircraft flew in nearly 10 percent of
the battlefield air-interdiction missions, among
the riskiest but most significant missions of the
war. For a review of Canada’s role, see David
L. Bashow [Lt. Col.] et al., “Mission Ready:
Canada’s Role in the Kosovo Air Campaign,”
Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2000.
100. Middlemiss and Stairs, p. 21.
101. Walker, p. 261.
102. Ibid., p. 262.
103. Ibid.
104. Following its grounding in Operation DESERT
STORM, Husky One was retired from active
service. DND is planning, however, to modify
two of its Airbus cargo planes to provide an
air-to-air refueling capability by 2004. “Can-
ada’s Troops Fight Budget Battle.”
105. Virtually the entire Canadian stockpile of
PGMs was used in the conflict, and in the
middle of the campaign DND officials feared
that Canada might run out of them. “Can-
ada’s Military Feared Running Out of Bombs
in Kosovo,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 October 1999.
Indeed, a recent report alleges that Canadian
air force officials pleaded with their U.S.
counterparts for an “emergency” resupply of
laser-guided munitions within weeks of the
beginning of Operation ALLIED FORCE. See
“Understocked Forces Begged U.S. for
Bombs,” National Post, 21 October 2002.
106. In ten of the first twenty-one days of Opera-
tion ALLIED FORCE, poor weather resulted in
cancellation of at least 50 percent of the strike
sorties. See Cordesman, p. 7.
107. Bashow et al., p. 60. This failure resulted in
an increased risk to all coalition pilots. Also
see David Kinsman, “Canada’s Air Opera-
tions in the Balkans,” National Network News,
Fall/Winter 1999.
108. As cited in Hobson, “Canada Aims for De-
fence Interoperability with United States.”
109. The computer capabilities of the CF-18s have
become the object of derision. During ALLIED
FORCE, it was reported that the 1970s-era
computers could malfunction if given com-
mands “at a critical weapon release point.”
See “Old Computers Inhibit CF-18s Accu-
racy: Report,” Calgary Herald, 31 May 1999.
110. For a look at the F-22, see John Tirpak, “The
Indispensable Fighter,” Air Force Magazine,
March 2001. For a review of the JSF and the
decision to award the contract to the Lockheed
Martin proposal, see James Fallows, “Uncle
R I C H T E R 1 0 1
35
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
Sam Buys an Airplane,” Atlantic Monthly,
June 2002.
111. Most of Canada’s European Nato allies will
be deploying new fighters by 2005. The
Eurofighter Typhoon is a multinational pro-
ject of the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain,
and Italy. The aircraft is currently undergoing
flight trials and is expected to become opera-
tional by mid-decade. In addition, France has
recently developed the Rafale, an advanced
fighter that is already in service.
112. In February 2002, Canada signed a memo-
randum of understanding with the United
States by which it committed itself to be an
“informed partner” in the second stage of the
Joint Strike Fighter development program, at
a cost of a hundred million dollars (U.S.). It
was reported that DND had estimated that it
would cost about seven billion to reequip the
air force with the new fighter (suggesting that
DND is considering an eventual purchase of
between sixty and eighty aircraft); see Sharon
Hobson, “Canada Joins JSF Programme,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 February 2002, and
“Canada to Spend $10.5B to Replace Aging
Warplanes,” Ottawa Citizen, 13 January 2002.
In spite of these developments, the Canadian
government is unlikely to allocate the finan-
cial resources required. Indeed, if this pro-
gram were ultimately approved, there would
be little funding available for any other CF
procurement project for years. Further, if
past experience offers any guide, the final cost
of the JSF will be considerably higher than the
current estimate.
113. Jockel, p. 98.
114. “Most Hercules Planes Not Ready to Fly,”
Ottawa Citizen, 24 November 2001.
115. See Sharon Hobson, “Canada Includes
C-130J as Transport Option,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 13 June 2001.
116. At a cost of about $150 million (U.S.) per air-
craft, the C-17 is easily the most expensive
transport plane ever built. One option that
DND is reportedly considering that would re-
duce the financial cost of a purchase is to
“share” C-17s with the United States. Under
the plan, Canada would buy or lease the
planes but make them available to the U.S.
military (or even private industry) when it
did not need them; see “Canada’s Troops
Fight Budget Battle.” In February 2002, it was
reported that a split had developed within the
air force between supporters of the new Her-
cules and those who preferred a small pur-
chase of C-17s; see “Forces Chiefs Differ on
Which Planes to Purchase,” National Post, 12
February 2002.
117. As noted in Sloan, The Revolution in Military
Affairs, p. 136.
118. The air force’s Website devotes considerable
attention to noncombat operations, including
peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, interna-
tional cooperation, and space policy: “The air
force flies peacekeeping missions and conveys
relief workers, emergency food and medical
supplies to scenes of natural disasters or where
armed conflicts have left little behind—allevi-
ating suffering and saving lives” (emphasis in
original, www.airforce.forces.ca/abroad).
119. Walker, p. 275.
120. For a history of Canada’s air force, see Sydney
Francis Wise, The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force (Toronto: Univ. of To-
ronto Press, 1980), and W. A. B. Douglas, The
Creation of a National Air Force (Toronto:
Univ. of Toronto Press and DND, 1986).
121. See “Canada Sends Third of Fleet,” Globe and
Mail, 9 October 2001.
122. Maritime aviation assets belong to the air
force, but they fall under the operational
command of the navy. A similar relationship
holds for army tactical aviation.
123. Jockel, p. 70.
124. Ibid., p. 71. Also see Sharon Hobson, “Slow
Progress for Canada’s Iroquois Destroyer,”
Jane’s Navy International, 1 July 2001.
125. They are former Royal Navy boats of the Up-
holder class. Relatedly, the navy has been ex-
amining possible replacements for the destroy-
ers for the past several years. One project it
continues to study is the Command/Control
and Area Air Defence Replacement (CADRE).
Other options include transferring the com-
mand and control capabilities into several
Halifax-class frigates, building entirely new
hulls, or acquiring another type of ship. See
Hobson, “Canada Aims for Defence Inter-
operability with United States.”
126. See Sharon Hobson, “Upholder Class Subma-
rines Resurface in Canada,” Jane’s Navy Inter-
national, 1 November 2001.
1 0 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
36
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
127. In the summer of 2002, a series of reports de-
tailing structural and operational problems
with the submarines left the navy unsure of
the wisdom of the acquisition. First, the navy
discovered significant hull damage to one of
the boats; shortly after, hairline cracks were
discovered in the diesel hull-exhaust valves of
two others. The various problems and repairs
will result in a delay of at least two years be-
fore the submarines will be ready for active
duty, now estimated to be 2004 at the earliest.
See “New Submarine a Lemon, Navy Finds,”
Toronto Star, 23 April 2002, and “Cracks May
Hold Up New Subs,” Halifax Daily News, 12
May 2002.
128. As of 2001 (prior to Operation APOLLO), six
Canadian ships had been integrated into U.S.
naval forces in the Arabian Gulf alone. Ac-
cording to DND, “The Canadian Navy is the
only foreign navy to successfully operate as
part of U.S. carrier battle groups”; see “Cana-
dian Navy Teams Up with U.S. Carrier Battle
Groups” (www.dnd.ca/menu/canada-us/
backgrounder). For a review of Canada-U.S.
naval cooperation, see Sokolsky, “Sailing in
Concert.”
129. It should be noted, though, that by August
2002 the Canadian naval commitment had
been reduced to three ships, a consequence of
the navy’s lack of enough personnel to main-
tain a significant overseas presence for more
than six months; see Granatstein, “A Friendly
Agreement in Advance,” p. 9. Also see “Frig-
ate Returns Home from War on Terrorism,”
CBC Website (www.cbc.ca), 18 August 2002.
130. See “Our Warships to Be Treated as ‘Ameri-
can,’” National Post, 9 October 2001.
131. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 12.
132. Chief of the Maritime Staff, Leadmark: The
Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate
of Maritime Strategy, 2001), p. 129.
133. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 12.
134. Each Sea King requires twenty-five to thirty
hours of maintenance for every hour it is
flown. See Sharon Hobson, “Evergreen Sea
King,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Spring
1998, p. 32.
135. The Maritime Helicopter Programme (MHP)
has become mired in a seemingly endless pro-
cess of contract specifications and require-
ments. Formal tenders, which had been
expected to be issued in the fall of 2002 (some
two years after the project was first an-
nounced), were not issued at that time; in
fact, according to defense officials familiar
with the project, the entire program may be
in “limbo.” The delay stems in part from the
government’s decision to split the contract in
two—one for the airframe and the other for
the electronics package—in spite of consider-
able evidence that doing so will significantly
increase the total cost of the program. As a
result, there are widespread allegations of po-
litical interference and indifference—hardly
surprising, considering that the Chretien gov-
ernment is surely embarrassed by the entire
project. Indeed, one of the leading bidders,
EH Industries, has charged that the govern-
ment has rigged the program to ensure that
its helicopter, a version of the EH-101 that
was canceled in 1993, is not selected. See
“Chopper Contract ‘Politically Driven,’” Ot-
tawa Citizen, 1 December 2001; “Sea King
Plan Cost $13 Million, No End in Sight,” Na-
tional Post, 31 January 2002; and “Program to
Replace Sea Kings in Limbo,” Ottawa Citizen,
25 August 2002.
136. According to a recent DND report, delays in
the MHP might require the Sea Kings to re-
main in service until 2010 or 2015, by which
time they would be more than fifty years old.
Until recently, the Canadian government had
insisted that the new helicopters would be in
service by 2005, in spite of unmistakable evi-
dence that such a timetable was unrealistic.
See “DND Warns of More Chopper Delays,”
Ottawa Citizen, 25 November 2001; “Pilot
Shrugs Off Sea King Delay,” Halifax Daily
News, 7 June 2002; and Sharon Hobson,
“Canada’s MHP Falls Even Further Behind,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 April 2002. In No-
vember 2002, news reports emerged of fur-
ther delays in the MHP, and for the first time
the government acknowledged that the exist-
ing timetable may be unachievable. See “Ot-
tawa Warns of New Delay for Helicopters,”
National Post, 7 November 2002.
137. So much attention is focused on the Sea
King’s age and maintenance difficulties that
the helicopter’s design and equipment defi-
ciencies tend to go largely unnoticed. In No-
vember 2001, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported
that the Sea Kings that were to join Operation
APOLLO lacked the warning systems needed
R I C H T E R 1 0 3
37
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
to defend themselves against missile attack, as
well as modern communications equipment.
See Sharon Hobson, “Canadian Helicopters
Deployed with Limited Self-Defence,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, 21 November 2001.
138. For a discussion, see Ernest Cable, “Canadian
Maritime Aviation: Requiem or Renais-
sance?” Canadian Defence Quarterly, Summer
1998.
139. See an additional paper by this author: “Stra-
tegic Ambitions and Fiscal Realities: Give the
Navy Priority,” Policy Options, April 2002.
140. See Chief of the Maritime Staff, chap. 3.
141. Sokolsky, “Sailing in Concert,” p. 13.
142. The obvious exceptions are the two oiler/
replenishment ships (AORs), whose main
tasks include at-sea replenishment of other
naval vessels and helicopter maintenance.
The navy is currently considering a proposal
to acquire an Afloat Logistics and Sealift Ca-
pability, represented by a ship that would
combine capabilities for fleet replenishment,
in-theater support to forces ashore, and stra-
tegic lift for the army. The navy is currently
trying to get the program “fast tracked.” For a
discussion, see Bruce T. Irvie [Lt. Cdr.],
“Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability for the
Canadian Navy,” Canadian Defence Quar-
terly, Summer 1997.
143. Both the Progressive Conservative (PC) and
Canadian Alliance (formerly Reform) parties
have been badly hurt by poor leadership and
scandal over the past decade. A “unite the
right” movement has for the past several
years been attempting to consolidate these
two right-of-center political parties, but with
little success. Indeed, such efforts appeared to
come to an end in August 2002 amid mutual
accusations and recriminations; see “Alliance,
Tories Agree Unity Dead,” National Post, 26
August 2002. Given the breakdown of voter
preferences in Canada, it is difficult—if not
impossible—to imagine the Liberals’ losing a
federal election as long as its two main rivals
continue to split the opposition vote, an ob-
servation widely discussed by polling firms
and political observers.
144. A recent Maclean’s poll indicates that the Ca-
nadian public is finally beginning to appreci-
ate the severity of the defense crisis. The poll
reveals that 68 percent of Canadians are in
favor of “substantially” increasing defense
spending, although they continue to view
peacekeeping as the military’s primary de-
fense task. The poll also shows that the mili-
tary is just one of many institutions the
public believes needs extra funding. See “In
Search of Our Role,” Maclean’s, 31 December
2001–1 January 2002.
145. The response of the Canadian government to
11 September was measured. With regard to
military action, Canada participated in the
U.S.-led war on terrorism (as noted). As for
domestic actions, the government introduced
two anti-terrorism bills, both of which give
the state strong powers. The government also
announced a comprehensive review of conti-
nental defense agreements with the United
States. In addition, in December 2001 the Ca-
nadian and U.S. governments reached a
broad agreement on border issues, including
surveillance, common enforcement measures,
and increased cooperation on entry. For an
American perspective on these developments,
see “In Canada, a Sea Change Follows Wave
of Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, 28 January
2002, and “Canada Debates Its Global Role
amid Dwindling Military,” Christian Science
Monitor, 23 July 2002. It should be noted,
though, that many of these steps appeared
defensive, as the government has been bat-
tling a widespread perception that Canada is
“weak” on terrorism. Indeed, American con-
cern over Canada’s lax immigration stan-
dards and unwillingness to take strong
measures against known terrorists in Canada
was a point of concern long before the at-
tacks; see, for example, “Canadians Shun U.S.
Efforts to Control Border,” Christian Science
Monitor, 8 February 2000, and “Border with
Canada Must Be Tightened, U.S. Expert
Says,” National Post, 24 February 2000. For a
more recent American look at Canada’s con-
tinued reluctance to change its refugee poli-
cies, see “Bordering on the Ridiculous,”
Washington Times, 17 August 2002. For a
critical overview of Canada’s approach to im-
migration, see Stephen Gallagher, “The Open
Door beyond the Moat: Canadian Refugee
Policy from a Comparative Perspective,” in
Canada among Nations 2002: A Fading Power,
ed. Norman Hillmer and Maureen Appel
Molot (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford Univ. Press,
2002).
1 0 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
38
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
146. “Eggleton Promises New Review of Defence,”
National Post, 10 November 2001. While
(former) Defence Minister Art Eggleton was
initially quite firm in his belief that a full-
scale review was needed (which would un-
doubtedly lead to a new white paper), by the
spring of 2002 the department’s plans had be-
come unclear, with some officials suggesting
that a simpler program review would suffice.
The confusion ended in July 2002, when the
new defense minister, John McCallum, con-
firmed that he was more interested in a pro-
gram review; see “McCallum Plans to Use the
Internet for Defence Policy Review,” Kingston
Whig-Standard, 27 July 2002. As an aside,
Eggleton was fired in May 2002 after reports
surfaced that he had awarded his girlfriend a
departmental contract.
147. The best example is the current edition of the
Canada among Nations series, an annual vol-
ume published by the Norman Paterson
School of International Affairs at Carleton
University that examines recent Canadian
foreign and security policy decisions and de-
velopments. The subtitle of the 2002 edition
(cited above) is A Fading Power; several of its
chapters deal with various aspects of Cana-
dian decline.
148. The debate over Canada’s status within the
international community is a long and con-
troversial one. One school, first popularized
in Canada by Lester Pearson and the diplomat-
scholar John Holmes, suggests that Canada’s
preference for multilateralism and skills
as a negotiator, its lack of the capabilities of a
great (or “principal”) power, and the fact that
it is too strong to be considered a minor (or
“satellite”) power make it an ideal “middle
power.” In the past few years, a new debate
has emerged over whether the end of the
Cold War has reduced the roles of middle
powers, as larger actors are now more willing
to undertake roles (like mediation and peace-
keeping) they previously ignored. While the
field is far too extensive to review here, a con-
troversial recent article examines the litera-
ture and concludes that Canada has skillfully
used its middle-power status to justify its role
in the international community: Adam
Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power
Myth,” International Journal, Spring 2000.
For a classic formulation, see John Holmes,
“Most Safely in the Middle,” International
Journal, Spring 1984.
149. “Armed Forces ‘Well-Equipped,’ Chretien
Fires Back,” National Post, 21 December
2001. The prime minister’s allegations were
reminiscent of the old “merchants of death”
thesis, which for obvious financial reasons
has never found much support in Canada.
150. The prime minister criticized Canada’s mili-
tary leaders for dated thinking, declaring that
“we have to adjust to the new reality of 2001,
but some are still thinking of the same strat-
egy of 1939.” Chretien further argued that
contemporary conflicts highlight airpower
(“It’s all airplanes, it’s all bombardment”)—
overlooking the fact that under his govern-
ment the air force has been decimated.
151. Oliver and Hampson, p. 135.
152. See “McCallum Admits Forces ‘Stretched,’”
National Post, 27 July 2002.
153. For a critical look at Canada’s commitment
to internationalism, see Kim Richard Nossal,
“Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of
‘Good International Citizenship’ in Canadian
Foreign Policy?” International Journal, Win-
ter 1998–99. Other observers have described
Canada’s foreign policy orientation as “selec-
tive internationalism”; see Jean-Francois
Rioux and Robin Hay, “Canadian Foreign
Policy: From Internationalism to Isolation-
ism” (paper published by the Norman Pater-
son School of International Affairs, Carleton
University, Discussion Paper 16, 1997).
154. In a cabinet shuffle announced on 15 January
2002, Manley became deputy prime minister
and finance minister, while Bill Graham, the
chairman of the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee for the past six years, was
named the new minister of foreign affairs. In-
terestingly, though, Manley retained respon-
sibility for handling U.S. relations in the area
of border security, an obviously critical issue
post-“9/11.” While Graham is still in the early
days of his tenure, his preachy, moralistic
tone appears reminiscent of Axworthy. For a
profile, see “Flamboyant MP Takes His Post
and Prepares to Represent Canada before the
World,” Globe and Mail, 22 January 2002.
155. Manley attracted considerable attention in
the summer of 2001, when he argued that
Canada could not continue to sit in various
R I C H T E R 1 0 5
39
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
international bodies and yet “go to the wash-
room” whenever bills come due. He also said
that Canada was “borderline in terms of [its]
ability to influence situations that are unex-
pected.” For a profile, see “Manley Trans-
formed by Tumultuous Year,” National Post,
27 December 2001.
156. See William Peters [Col.], “Beyond Kosovo:
Will Canada’s Army Fight for the Western
Alliance?” in Transforming an Army: Land
Warfare Capabilities for the Future Army, ed.
Shaye Friesen, DLSC Report 9904 (Ottawa:
DND, Directorate of Land Strategic Con-
cepts, 1999), p. 83.
157. Among recent studies, see Michael P. Noonin
and John Hillen, “The Promise of Decisive
Action,” Orbis, Spring 2002; William J. Perry,
“Preparing for the Next Attack,” Foreign Af-
fairs, November/December 2001; and John A.
Nagl, “Hitting Us Where We Don’t Expect It:
Asymmetric Threats to U.S. National Secu-
rity,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Au-
tumn 2001.
158. In August 2002, the defense minister,
McCallum, noted in a letter sent to several
strategic-studies organizations that there was
a need to “redirect resources” so that future
defense capabilities could be pursued. The
comment was widely interpreted as indicat-
ing that the CF will not get any significant in-
fusion of new funding in the near future; see
“Minister Hints Forces Won’t Get New
Money,” National Post, 2 August 2002. In ad-
dition, Prime Minister Chretien’s surprise an-
nouncement in August 2002 that he will
resign in February 2004 will likely result in
even more spending pressure, as defense is
clearly not high on his list of priorities for so-
lidifying his political legacy. See “PM’s
Agenda Ignores Forces: Critics,” Ottawa Citi-
zen, 28 August 2002. While McCallum has
subsequently begun calling for increased de-
fense spending, by late 2002 there were no in-
dications that these efforts would yield results
anytime soon. See “McCallum Seeks Huge
Hike in Military Budget,” National Post, 25
October 2002.
159. See “Military in Relentless Decline,” National
Post, 30 May 2002. The report is titled “De-
fence Policy Update: Sustainability.”
160. Henault, p. 33 [emphasis added].
161. Ibid., p. 15.
162. See “High-Tech Weapons Change the Dy-
namics and the Scope of Battle,” International
Herald Tribune, 28 December 2001;
“Studying Lessons of Battle Success,” Los An-
geles Times, 17 December 2001; “Special
Forces’ High Profile Could Yield a Budget In-
crease,” Washington Post, February 4, 2002;
Andrew Koch, “United States Appraises Les-
sons Learned In Afghanistan,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 24 April 2002; and Michael O’Hanlon,
“A Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs, May/
June 2002. In August 2002, a debate over how
to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in
Iraq pitted those who called for a repeat of
the “Afghanistan model” against those who
maintained that any Iraqi operation would
require hundreds of thousands of American
ground troops, much like Operation DESERT
STORM had eleven years earlier. For a review,
see “Theater of War,” Time, 12 August 2002,
and “Afghanistan Lessons Don’t Apply to
Iraq, General Says,” Washington Times, 22
August 2002. Interestingly, the primary sup-
porters of the new model are civilians, led by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
Vice President Dick Cheney, while those em-
phasizing the need for a massive ground as-
sault are military professionals (or former
ones), led by Secretary of State Colin Powell
and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Richard Myers. The issue was apparently re-
solved in November 2002, when it was re-
ported that the U.S. military had finalized its
invasion plan of Iraq, which would involve a
total force of two hundred thousand person-
nel. See “War Plan for Iraq Ready, Say Ob-
servers,” Washington Post, 10 November 2002
and “Bush Approves Iraq War Plan, Large
Force Seen,” Reuters News Service, 9 Novem-
ber 2002.
163. The newer Link-16 tactical data system has
dramatically decreased the time required for
the air force to locate and strike targets. See
Phillip S. Meilinger, “Force Divider: How
Military Technology Makes the United States
Even More Unilateral,” Foreign Policy,
January/February, 2002.
164. The emerging capabilities of UAVs were
highlighted in February 2002 when a U.S.
Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile at an
Afghani convoy that may have included se-
nior al-Qa‘ida officials. The Predator’s live
1 0 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
40
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss1/5
video feed, combined with the ability to fire
its missile by remote control, gives the United
States at least a limited capability to strike tar-
gets within seconds of their detection. See
“CIA May Have Hit al-Qaeda Leader,” Na-
tional Post, 8 February 2002. This capability
was further highlighted in November 2002,
when a car carrying several al-Qa‘ida officials
in Yemen was similarly hit by a missile fired
from a Predator. See “Sky Wars: Remote
Targetting Changes the Nature of Warfare,”
Times Online, 6 November 2002 (www
.timesonline.com).
165. Art Eggleton, then defense minister, was
widely derided in November 2001 for saying
that Canada would not send troops “into a
condition in which they are unwelcome.” The
comment, made at a time when it was unclear
whether the government would commit
ground forces to Afghanistan, drew (largely
negative) attention to the fighting capabilities
of Canada’s army; see “Troops Won’t Go If
They’re ‘Unwelcome,’” Globe and Mail, 20
November 2001. The 850 Canadian troops
deployed to Afghanistan between February
and July 2002 provided airport security, per-
formed land-mine removal, assisted in track-
ing and capturing remaining Taliban and
al-Qa‘ida fighters, and helped protect aid op-
erations. Their deployment did not indicate a
major ground combat capability; they were
neither equipped nor trained to fight in a
high-intensity combat environment.
166. A recent British study examined the role the
United Kingdom can play in coalition opera-
tions and the interoperability challenges that
must be met for it to do so. See Coalitions and
the Future of UK Security Policy (London:
Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies, 2000).
167. Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs,
p. 48.
168. See U.S. Dept. of Defense, Concept for Future
Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chief of Staff,
1997).
169. Jockel, p. 121.
170. William Perry, “Military Action: When to Use
It and How to Ensure Its Effectiveness,” in
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security
in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 236.
171. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has warned
about the dangers of coalitions and the threat
they may pose to effective military opera-
tions: “The mission must determine the coali-
tion; the coalition must not determine the
mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed
down to the lowest common denominator,
and we can’t afford that.” Cited in G. John
Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002,
p. 54.
R I C H T E R 1 0 7
41
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
